The Globalization of "Secondary Cities" in the Middle East and North Africa: Conceptual Considerations and Empirical Findings

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Abstract: The article aims to demonstrate that "secondary cities," like "world cities" that, also in the Global South, are in the focus of current urban research, are experiencing transformations from rapid "globalisation" to progressive "neoliberalisation" of urban policies and developing "postmodern" characteristics. Urban decision-makers also endeavour to place these cities on decisive positions in networks and flows of commodities, people and images. Certainly, these places are not at the levers commanding globalisation nor are they present in all circuits of importance worldwide. But, while some cities simply feel "exposed" to globalisation, others struggle actively to integrate into transnational and transregional, often very specific circuits to foster socio-economic and urban development. Places that are simultaneously port or border cities particularly benefit from their strategic positioning. However, this does not necessarily benefit the majority of the population and favours further socio-spatial fragmentation. Based on this assessment, the article elaborates some conceptual elements that show the important role of these cities of secondary rank in national, regional and global contexts. Empirically, besides a few case studies found in existing literature, it presents Tangier, Morocco, Salalah, Oman, and Edirne, Turkey, as eminent examples from the MENA region that demonstrate their recent (re)emergence and some common characteristics, as well as divergent trajectories.

Keywords: Urban Development, Secondary Cities, Globalisation, Neoliberalisation, Postmodernisation, Fragmentation, Infrastructure.

1 . From the Study of "Islamic Cities" to "Global Cities"

1.1. From the traditional city in the Islamic Orient to the polycentric post-oil city in the Arab Gulf region

There was a time when "cities in the Muslim world" were primarily conceived as prototypical "Islamic" or "Oriental" cities.[1] The concept of the "Muslim" or "Islamic" city is based on Western, mainly French, colonial research, notably from the late 1920s to the end of the 1950s, and closely linked to Orientalism; it is associated with scholars like Georges Marçais, Roger Le Tourneau, Jean Sauvaget and finally Gustave von Grunebaum, or Ira Lapidus for a second strand

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1. This article is based on a talk that the author gave at the international symposium "The City in the Muslim World: Genesis and Mutation," organized by The Academy of the Kingdom of Morocco in partnership with *Hespéris-Tamuda* and the Faculty of Letters and Human Sciences, University of Rabat, on 6 February 2020, and on previous work on the three cities presented below at the (now: *Leibniz-) Zentrum Moderner Orient* (ZMO), Berlin, and the Center for Near and Middle Eastern Studies (CNMS), Philipps-Universität Marburg.

of research.[2] Among the assumptions, we find the fundamental role of Islam in producing and structuring urban space and in establishing specific institutions for the organisation of political, social and economic life; a fundamentally negative conception of an anarchic and disordered "non-city" prevails. From the late 1960s on, especially German human geographers such as Klaus Dettmann, Eckart Ehlers and Eugen Wirth contributed to developing conceptualisations of a more general "Oriental city" focusing particularly on spatial and economic characteristics.[3] These considerations coincided with the heyday of cultural geography, which endeavoured to divide the world into distinct "civilisational areas": for this, Albert Kolb, in the 1960s, and Jürgen Newig, in the 1980s, resorted to earlier considerations such as those Ewald Banse developed in the early XXth century and defined an "Oriental" world region of its own determined by historical, cultural, societal and natural factors.[4] In a case of colonial acculturation, the concept of Islamic towns has also been adopted by Arab-Muslim researchers and planners searching for the reproduction of past urban patterns in contemporary cities.

Today, paralleling the general concept of the "Orient," such approaches are being blamed for their culturalism and essentialism, overgeneralising individual case studies and insights from specific sub-regions. They are said to homogenise the Islamic world without recognising its heterogeneity; conceived as time-transcending models, they do not account for specific trajectories and multiple historical – from ancient Oriental and Greco-Roman to colonial and nationalist

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2. Cf. references, e.g. in André Raymond, "Islamic City, Arab City: Orientalist Myths and Recent Views," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 21, 1 (1994): 3 (fn. 2-4); Janet L. Abu-Lughod, "The Islamic City: Historic Myth, Islamic Essence, and Contemporary Relevance," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 19, 2 (1987): 155-76. The enumeration of authors and approaches is not exhaustive, but exemplary.

3. For an overview of German conceptualisations, cf. Heinz Heineberg, *Stadtgeographie*, 3rd, updated and expanded ed. (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2006), 288-94; Jürgen Bähr and Ulrich Jürgens, *Stadtgeographie II: Regionale Stadtgeographie* (Braunschweig: Westermann, 2009), 223-37; from the protagonists, e.g., Klaus Dettmann, *Damaskus: Eine orientalische Stadt zwischen Tradition und Moderne* (Erlangen: Palm & Enke, 1969); Eckart Ehlers, "Die Stadt des Islamischen Orients: Modell und Wirklichkeit," *Geographische Rundschau* 45, 1 (1993): 32-39; Eugen Wirth, "Die orientalische Stadt: Ein Überblick aufgrund jüngerer Forschungen zur materiellen Kultur," *Saeculum* 26, 1 (1975): 45-94.

4. Cf. Anton Escher, "Die geographische Gestaltung des Begriffs Orient im 20. Jahrhundert," in *Orient – Orientalistik – Orientalismus: Geschichte und Aktualität einer Debatte*, ed. Burkhard Schnepel, Gunnar Brands and Hanne Schönig (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2011), 123-49; for the named authors, e.g., Ewald Banse, "Der Orient-ein geographischer Begriff?," *Deutsche Rundschau für Geographie und Statistik* 31, 1 (1908): 1-7; Albert Kolb, "Die Geographie und die Kulturerdteile," in *Hermann von Wissmann-Festschrift*, ed. Adolf Leidlmair (Tübingen: Selbstverlag des Geographischen Instituts der Universität, 1962), 42-49; Jürgen Newig, "Drei Welten oder eine Welt: Die Kulturerdteile," *Geographische Rundschau* 38, 5 (1986): 262-67. While Newig felt obliged to underline the tentativeness and permeability of civilizational border-drawing, his article shows many similarities to Huntington's much-discussed "The Clash of Civilizations," developed in the 1990s in International Relations theory. Cf. also Dieter Haller, "Geister im Raum: Cultural Areas in Zeiten der ontologischen Wende," in *Jenseits etablierter Meta-Geographien: Der Nahe Osten und Nordafrika in transregionaler Perspektive*, ed. Steffen Wippel and Andrea Fischer-Tahir (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2018), 71-90, for similar culture area concepts in German and American cultural anthropology in the first half of the 20th century.

– layers of city development.[5] Vice versa, this stance exaggerated regional specificities, without taking into account transregional similarities, e.g. with medieval towns north of the Mediterranean. Even if we consider these models to have been appropriate for a certain historical period, today, they do not cope with extended contemporary urban agglomerations. Updated regionally specific approaches followed, in particular with regard to the Gulf region, which consider the development from traditional compact "pre-oil" to modern sprawling "oil" and postmodern polycentric "post-oil cities."[6] Yet, they do not fit the entire region of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) either, not to mention a spatially still far more encompassing Islamicate world.

Therefore, more and more researchers started to apply more recent and general macro-urban conceptual approaches to contemporary cities in this part of the world; however, they mostly have continued to concentrate on its big metropolises and capital cities. Accordingly, in the following, my focus will briefly address ideas popular in urban studies of "global cities," postmodern urban development and the neoliberalisation of the urban. In a more elaborate second step, I will conclude that these considerations could and should also be applied to a secondary layer of cities to cover a larger range of places with similar experiences, and not only to the primary national, regional and global urban centres. This will be followed by a number of case studies based on my own research and, then, be supplemented by a few results found in existing literature. Finally, I will summarise and compare these insights against the conceptual background in the last part of the article. Geographically, to somewhat reduce complexity, I will concentrate only on the wider MENA region. It already suffers from inconsistent definitions and designates a vaguely delimited and culturally heterogeneous area,[7] but will give a more spatially bound focus than the even more difficult endeavour of defining an "Islamic(ate) world." Yet, I acknowledge that it is difficult to generalise findings from the MENA region to cities, e.g. on the Indian subcontinent, in the Malay world, Central Asia, the Balkans, the Sahel or along the Swahili coast.

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5. For diverse critiques, see e.g. Abu-Lughod, "The Islamic City;" Raymond, "Islamic City;" Noha Nasser, "Islamicate Urbanism: The State of the Art," *Built Environment* 28, 3 (2002): 173-86. Cf. also Escher, "Die geographische Gestaltung," esp. 139, 143. Cf. also Edward W. Said's seminal work *Orientalism* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978).

6. Cf., e.g., Michael E. Bonine and Rainer Cordes, "Oil Urbanization: Zum Entwicklungsprozeß eines neuen Typs orientalischer Städte," *Geographische Rundschau* 35, 9 (1983): 461-66; Brigitte Dumortier and Marc Lavergne, "Doubaï: ville du pétrole ou projet métropolitain post-pétrolier," *Annales de Géographie* 111, 623 (2002): 41-59; Nadine Scharfenort, *Urbane Visionen am Arabischen Golf: Die Post-Oil Cities Abu Dhabi, Dubai und Sharjah* (Frankfurt/Main, New York: Campus, 2009).

7. Cf. Thomas Scheffler, "'Fertile Crescent,' 'Orient,' 'Middle East': The Changing Maps of Southwest Asia," *European Review of History* 10, 2 (1993): 253-72; Escher, "Die geographische Gestaltung"; Michael E. Bonine, Abbas Amanat and Michael Ezekiel Gasper (eds.), *Is There a Middle East? The Evolution of a Geopolitical Concept* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012).

1.2. From "primate cities" to "global" and "world cities"

General urban research experienced a revival since approximately the late 1980s with new perspectives on "global" and "world cities" and studies of cities' neoliberal transformation and postmodern development; simultaneously, this reflects a shift from a cultural-historical, morphogenetic urban geography developed since the 1930s to critical and postmodern approaches.[8]

For a long time, "primate cities" in national urban systems – a term coined by Mark Jefferson in the late 1930s – attracted paramount academic interest.[9] In particular, this concerned the political and economic capitals in successor states of former colonies and dissolved empires, often characterised by a high degree of administrative centralisation, economic outward orientation and a much greater importance than the next cities in the urban hierarchy, as we also often find in MENA countries.[10] Even if early authors already recognised that primate cities also radiate beyond national borders and link the national and world economies,[11] in the late 1980s, John Friedmann effected a definite shift in perspective from nationally bound metropolises to their transnational roles as "world cities."[12] Soon afterwards, Saskia Sassen popularised the term "global cities,"[13] and, paralleling the increasing discourse on economic and cultural globalisation, scholars like Peter Taylor and colleagues followed suit in investigating such worldwide dominating and radiating urban places and developing these conceptualisations further.[14]

As a common denominator, these authors point to the emergence of a hierarchical global network of cities under conditions of contemporary globalisation, bypassing national limitations and hierarchies. Global cities are directly connected to the world economy, house the headquarters of worldwide leading industries, especially in highly specialised services (such as finance, insurance and real estate), stand out as basing points for international capital and constitute strategic nodes for the control and command of the world economy.

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8. For a more elaborate sequence of urban geographical approaches, cp. Heineberg, *Stadtgeographie*, 13-24.

9. Cf. Mark Jefferson, "Why Geography? The Law of the Primate City," *Geographical Review* 29, 2 (1939): 226-32.

10. Cf. also Brian Berry, "City Size Distributions and Economic Development," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 9, 4 (1961): 573-88.

11. Cf. also Brad Lyman, "Urban Primacy and World-System Position," *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 28, 1 (1992): 22-37.

12. Cf. John Friedmann, "The World City Hypothesis," *Development and Change* 17, 1 (1986): 69-83.

13. Cf. Saskia Sassen, *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo*. 2nd ed. (Princeton, London: Princeton University Press, 2001).

14. Cf. Peter J. Taylor, *World City Network: A Global Urban Analysis* (London, New York: Routledge, 2004); Jonathan V. Beaverstock, Richard G. Smith and Peter J. Taylor, "World-City Network: A New Metageography?," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 90, 1 (2000): 123-34. Cp. also the overview of global and postmodern city approaches in Heineberg, *Stadtgeographie*, 337-65.

Broader perspectives have added political, social and cultural dimensions to the purely economic variables: this includes the presence of international institutions, the holding of globally acknowledged events, the role as main transport hubs and central destinations for tourism and migration and global influence in fields such as research and media. Beyond hierarchical status, authors also conceptualised relational centrality based on strong interurban connectivities and specific extended "hinterworlds" as characteristics of world and global cities. Some scholars also underline that globally connected cities are not only a contemporary phenomenon, but already existed earlier, e.g. along the historical Silk Road from East Asia through the Arab world to Western Europe.[15]

1.3. The "postmodern city" and neoliberal urban transformation

Other authors have conceptualised the postmodern and neoliberal developments of cities that partly show similar transformations and effects. For Edward Soja, the postmodern city has experienced six major "restructurings" over recent decades.[16] Among the new urban geographies of these "postmetropolises," he, too, pointed to the transformation of the economic system towards a post-Fordist production mode and to processes of internationalisation and globalisation instigating the development of globally networked cities with worldwide hinterlands. According to him, concurrent processes of decentralisation, recentralisation and polycentralisation radically restructure urban forms, particularly through the emergence of "exopolises," i.e. the growth of the outer cities and the development of "edge cities." New industrial estates and "technopoles," centres of high-tech manufacturing and information-based industries, have spread outside modern central business districts. Specialised economic areas like free zones and techno-parks are often established far from urban centres and contribute to the spatial dispersal of urban agglomerations.

Finally, the neoliberal transformation of the urban has become a much-debated issue.[17] In the context of downscaling competencies, cities, too, have become central fields of application for neoliberal programmes. Neoliberal development of cities means the generalisation and radicalisation of the economic principle and its enforcement with the massive help of state institutions, often by means of anti-liberal policies. It propagates the entrepreneurial city and

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15. Cf. Taylor, *World City Network*, 8-13.

16. Cf. Edward W. Soja, *Postmetropolis: Critical Studies of Cities and Regions* (Oxford, Malden: Blackwell, 2000). See also Michael Dear and Steven Flusty, "Postmodern Urbanism," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 88, 1 (1998): 50-72.

17. Cf., e.g., Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore, "Cities and the Geographies of 'Actually Existing Neoliberalism'," *Antipode* 34, 3 (2002): 349-79; Erik Swyngedouw, Frank Moulaert and Arantxa Rodríguez, "Neoliberal Urbanization in Europe: Large-Scale Urban Development Projects and the New Urban Policy," *Antipode* 34, 3 (2002): 542-77; Michael Storper, "The Neo-liberal City as Idea and Reality," *Territory, Politics, Governance* 4, 2 (2016): 241-63; Susanne Heeg and Marit Rosol, "Neoliberale Stadtpolitik im globalen Kontext: Ein Überblick," *Prokla, Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialwissenschaft* 37, 4 (2007): 491-509.

has far-reaching effects on urban policies. Cities enter tightened interurban competition beyond national borders, and responsible actors seek regulatory, fiscal and infrastructure-enhancing provisions and to integrate cities in global commodity and capital flows. Urban planning provides much more for the interests of profit-oriented investors than for broader social needs. New urban coalitions include public, parastate and national and transnational private actors in political processes of negotiation and decision that are often opaque. Interactions exist, for instance, between "neoliberalisation"[18] as a catalyst for intensifying global entanglements and globalisation as a pretext for pushing neoliberal transformations.

1.4. Interurban competition and socio-spatial fragmentation as major effects

Common to all these approaches is the need that responsible actors perceive to enter an unprecedented interurban competition for resources, influence and recognition. The high degree of global integration has far-reaching effects on physical urban landscapes, such as the establishment of new infrastructure, quarters and buildings, frequently of spectacular design, and the spread of production, consumption and leisure facilities, primarily oriented towards exportation, the luxury segment and an affluent clientele, across metropolitan areas.[19] Branding cities and large urban development projects has become an important tool to draw international attention.[20]

However, such transformations rarely capture cities entirely: cities are hardly ever totally "global," "neoliberal" or "postmodern."[21] Typically, "globally integrated urban fragments," as Fred Scholz called them, are much more connected to other world centres by production, information and infrastructure links than with their immediate surroundings.[22] The reverse side of these restructuring processes

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18. For this focus on process rather than status, cf. especially Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell, "Neoliberalizing Space," *Antipode* 34, 3 (2002): 380-404.

19. Cf. also Monica W. Varsanyi, "Global Cities from the Round Up: A Response to Peter Taylor," *Political Geography* 19 (2000): 33-38; Richard Stren, "Local Governance and Social Diversity in the Developing World: New Challenges for Globalizing City-Regions," in *Global City-Regions: Trends, Theory, Policy*, ed. Allen J. Scott (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 193-213.

20. For city branding in times of globalisation, neoliberalism and postindustrialism, see, for instance, Ari-Veikko Anttiroiko, *The Political Economy of City Branding* (Abingdon, New York: Routledge, 2014); Joern Langhorst, "Rebranding the Neoliberal City: Urban Nature as Spectacle, Medium, and Agency," *Architecture_media_politics_society* 6, 4 (2015): 1-15; for marketing as a genuine expression of postmodernism, A. Fuat Fırat, Nikhilesh Dholakia and Alladi Venkatesh, "Marketing in a postmodern world," *European Journal of Marketing* 29, 1 (1995): 40-56.

21. For the heterogenous process of globalisation, cp. Jennifer Robinson, "Global and World Cities: A View from off the Map," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 26, 3 (2002): 531-54.

22. Cf. Fred Scholz, *Geographische Entwicklungsforschung: Methoden und Theorien* (Berlin, Stuttgart: Gebrüder Borntraeger, 2004), 225. Cf. also Stephen Graham and Simon Marvin, *Splintering Urbanism: Networked Infrastructures, Technological Mobilities and the Urban Condition*. Reprint (London, New York: Routledge, 2009).

is increasing social disparities and spatial fragmentation, including the fostering of informal activities. According to Soja, such "fractal" postmodern cities are characterised by accentuated ethnic heterogeneity and economic polarisation.[23] Globally operating centres and representative, citadel-like residential quarters contrast with adjacent low-standard habitats and workshop areas. Emblematic is the contrast between top-level "no-entrance zones" and deprived "no-go areas" left economically and socially behind.[24] Authors on postmodern development emphasise the privatisation of space and the fortification of certain areas. Access to the growing number of walled and fenced economic zones and gated communities and to other areas of "territorial exclusion"[25] is physically controlled, socially segregated or economically exclusive.

1.5. Research biased towards northern metropolises

Originally, the debate initiated by Sassen concentrated on New York, London and Tokyo as the top triad of cities in the Global North.[26] Increasingly, the samples under study extended to a larger range of places of global standing, and tiered categorisations of globalness developed.[27] It is now increasingly accepted that numerous world and global cities also exist in the "Global South," in fact not only in emerging countries, and that they undertake considerable endeavours for "worlding,"[28] i.e. to position themselves in far-reaching urban networks and to attract international attention, too. The Loughborough-based "Global and World Cities" (GaWC) network, initiated by Peter Taylor, established the largest selection, with almost four hundred cities, ordered in α, β and γ levels, in the latest ranking.[29] In its 20 years of existence, besides the ranking's general shift towards non-Western metropolises, MENA cities increasingly showed up in the lists and climbed in position, (fig. 1). Notably Dubai advanced in this period from the lowest to the highest scores and rapidly emerged as a top global city.

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23. Cf. Soja, *Postmetropolis*, 264-97.

24. Cf. Scholz, *Geographische Entwicklungsforschung*, 239-40.

25. Stren, "Local Governance," 202. Cf. also Soja, *Postmetropolis*, 298-322.

26. See Sassen, *Global City*.

27. Cf. for instance, Taylor, *World City Network*.

28. Ananya Roy and Aihwa Ong (eds.), *Worlding Cities: Asian Experiments and the Art of Being Global* (Chichester, Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011); for MENA cities, cf. Raffael Beier, "Worlding Cities in the Middle East and North Africa-Arguments for a Conceptual Turn," *Middle East-Topics & Arguments* 12 (2019): 28-34. https://meta-journal.net/issue/view/230, accessed 19 July 2019.

29. Cf. "Globalization and World Cities Research Network," http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc; for the lists, see "The World According to GaWC," https://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/gawcworlds.html, both accessed 23 July 2019.

1998 categories (n = 55)		2018 categories (n = 375)	
Alpha (full-service) world cities		**Alpha-level cities**	
12	London, New York, Paris, Tokyo	α++	London, New York
		α+	Hong Kong, Beijing, Singapore, …, **Dubai**
11	Chicago, …	α	İstanbul
10		α-	Riyadh
Beta (major) world cities		**Beta-level cities**	
9		β+	Cairo, Jeddah, Doha, Tel Aviv
8		β	Abu Dhabi, Beirut, Casablanca, Kuwait, Manama
7		β-	Tunis
Gamma (minor) world cities		**Gamma-level cities**	
6		γ+	Muscat
5		γ	Algiers, Amman, Ankara
4	İstanbul	γ-	
Evidence of world city formation		**Cities with sufficiency of services**	
3	Tel Aviv	**High sufficiency**	İzmir
2	Abu Dhabi, Cairo, **Dubai**, Riyadh	**Sufficiency**	Alexandria, Baghdad, Bursa, Dammam, Jerusalem, Sana'a*
1	Tehran		

Fig. 1: MENA cities in the GaWC world cities ranking
* Removed from the previous (2016) list: Haifa, Mosul, Tripoli.

Besides MENA cities, this table also gives the worldwide top 5 cities (in italics). Note: There was an important change from initial attribute measures to more sophisticated relational measures between 1998 and 2000 (and afterwards). (Sources: "Inventory of World Cities (1998)," https://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/citylist.html; "The World According to GaWC 2018," https://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/world2018t.html, both accessed 23 July 2019).

Actually, however, studies on cities in the South remain underrepresented. This is even truer for the MENA region: notwithstanding some important exceptions, investigations of global cities mostly have concentrated on a few historically well-established and rapidly emerging big metropolises, including political and economic capitals, such as Cairo, İstanbul, Beirut and, in the last

decade and a half, especially Dubai. Similarly, approaches like neoliberalisation and postmodernisation have been applied only with some delay and to a limited number of places, too. Again, Gulf cities have been in the focus of scrutinising postmodern development, with Dubai being characterized as hyper-capitalistic[30] and an example of postmodern urbanism.[31] In contrast, only recently has a comprehensive comparative overview of neoliberalising the urban in the Arab world gone beyond existing individual studies.[32]

This is all the more at issue as such concrete processes of globalisation, neoliberalisation and postmodernisation are not uniform, but widely adapt, alter and vary in accordance with local circumstances and conditions, especially in cities of the Southern hemisphere.[33] There is a preeminent role of global role models, yet, such widely emulated examples also emerged in the MENA's "own" world region: in particular, "Dubaisation" (or "Gulfication") has taken place in widening geographical circles (Gulf, MENA, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa) and through multiple transmission channels that include circulating media images, Gulf investors and developers and migrants' experiences and aspirations.[34]

2. The Globalisation of "Secondary Cities"

2.1. Secondary cities in global and transregional networks

Many authors have criticised the global city approach for its focus on a rather limited range of cities, which excludes substantial parts of the globe as a negligible remnant mostly "off the map."[35] In particular, it has widely disregarded cities of secondary rank in national, regional and global contexts, particularly in the Global South. According to Jennifer Robinson, globalisation is not limited

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30. Cf. Mike Davis, *Le stade Dubaï du capitalisme* (Paris: Les Prairies ordinaires, 2007).

31. Cf. Boris Brorman Jensen, *Dubai: Dynamics of Bingo Urbanism* (Copenhagen: The Architectural Publisher, 2007).

32. Cf. Ala Al-Hamarneh, Jonas Margraff and Nadine Scharfenort (eds.), *Neoliberale Urbanisierung: Stadtentwicklungsprozesse in der arabischen Welt* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2019) (also contains contributions in English). For a general view, cf. also Susanne Heeg, "Neoliberalism and Neoliberalization: Helpful Devices for the Analysis of Urban Development in the Middle East and North Africa," *Middle East-Topics & Arguments* 12 (2019): 18-26. https://meta-journal.net/issue/view/230, accessed 19 July 2019.

33. For different trajectories of neoliberalisation, e.g. in Europe and the Global South, cf., among others, Storper, "The Neo-liberal City," 257; Heeg and Rosol, "Neoliberale Stadtpolitik;" also Brenner and Theodore, "Cities," 350; Peck and Tickell, "Neoliberalizing Space," 380-81.

34. Cf. Yasser Elsheshtawy, "From Dubai to Cairo: Competing Global Cities, Models, and Shifting Centers of Influence?," in *Cairo Cosmopolitan: Politics, Culture, and Urban Space in the New Globalized Middle East*, ed. Diane Singerman and Paul Amar (Cairo, New York: The American University in Cairo Press, 2006), 235-50, and "Dubai," 249-79; Amar Drissi and Thierry de Montbrial (eds.), *Dubai, The New Arab Dream* (Paris: IFRI, 2006); Steffen Wippel, Katrin Bromber, Christian Steiner and Birgit Krawietz (eds.), *Under Construction: Logics of Urbanism of Architecture and Infrastructure in the Gulf Region* (Farnham, Burlington: Ashgate, 2014), passim.

35. Robinson, "Global and World Cities." This has changed only gradually since the publication of the article in 2002.

to a relatively small number of outstanding metropolises, but has affected innumerable "ordinary cities" all over the world,[36] and for Peter Taylor there are no "non-global cities" any more.[37] Consequently, Peter Marcuse and Ronald von Kempen consider almost all cities to be "globalising cities" affected by and contributing to contemporary globalisation.[38] Fred Scholz differentiates "acting global cities" that contribute actively to global processes from "affected" or "exposed" global cities (or "globalised cities") that are hierarchically subordinate to the previous ones.[39]

In line with this, Dennis Rondinelli had already coined the term "secondary cities" in the 1980s.[40] Afterwards, only a few publications took up this notion, but in the last decade it has become much more popular in urban research and policies.[41] Such cities are considered important places of residence, work and belonging for many people, contribute to averting demographic, economic and infrastructural pressure on the largest cities and sometimes even show greater economic growth and more favourable living conditions. Their definition is often limited to a certain range of population size (e.g. between 100,000 and 1 million inhabitants or between 10% and 50% of the national primate city's population), but should also include their sometimes eminent role in certain sectors and networks.

Secondary cities serve as interfaces between rural and urban realms as well as between sub-national, national and global scales. They also struggle to find their own paths of urban and economic advancement and to place themselves on the world map, but frequently face important financial, political and institutional challenges, notably in centralised and less developed economies, where attention still concentrates on the big metropolises. Their often peripheral situation in existing territorial states confers on them supplementary nodal functions in

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36. Robinson, "Global and World Cities."

37. Taylor, *World City Network*.

38. Peter Marcuse and Ronald van Kempen (eds.), *Globalizing Cities: A New Spatial Order?* (London, Cambridge: Blackwell, 2000).

39. Cf. Scholz, *Geographische Entwicklungsforschung*, 221-49.

40. Dennis A. Rondinelli, *Secondary Cities in Developing Countries: Policies for Diffusing Urbanization* (Beverly Hills, London, New Delhi: Sage, 1983).

41. See, e.g. Brian Roberts and Rene Peter Hohmann, *The Systems of Secondary Cities: The Neglected Drivers of Urbanising Economies*. CIVIS no. 7 (Brussels: Cities Alliance, 2014). http://www.citiesalliance.org/sites/citiesalliance.org/files/CIVIS%20SECONDARY%20CITIES_Final.pdf, accessed 12 Aug. 2015; Brian H. Roberts, *Managing Systems of Secondary Cities: Policy Responses in International Development* (Brussels: Cities Alliance, 2014); Ahmed Kanna and Xiangming Chen, "Introduction: Bringing the Less Familiar Cities In and Together," in *Rethinking Global Urbanism: Comparative Insights from Secondary Cities*, ed. Xiangming Chen and Ahmed Kanna (New York, Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 1-14. For the networking of secondary cities and contributions to broader processes in historical perspective, cf. Kenneth R. Hall, "Introduction," in *Secondary Cities and Urban Networking in the Indian Ocean Realm, c. 1400-1800*, ed. Kenneth R. Hall (Plymouth: Lexington, 2008), 1-16.

specific global and (trans)regional[42] circuits of quite different spatial reaches, through which people, commodities and practices pass – e.g. in domains like trade and transport, advanced manufacturing, tourism, education, media and entertainment, and, last but not least, culture, science and religion.[43] Hence, they may have considerable supplementary roles in the working of the global urban system and the deployment of globalisation processes. Yet, their respective degrees, intensities and constellations of global or wider regional integration may differ considerably.

Accordingly, secondary cities should be analysed with reference not only to the national and subnational texture, but also to their regional and global interconnections. Research should not forget to investigate how such urban places experience, accommodate and actively contribute to contemporary globalisation and neoliberalisation and the extent to which they exhibit postmodern features, with all their positive and negative consequences. However, until recently, research has not built much on these observations. Even if considerable research has always been produced on small and medium-sized cities in national, e.g. German and French contexts,[44] and, since colonial times, also in Morocco, they are thematically and spatially more limited and tackle more specific, locally focused topics, rather than the cities' insertion in worldwide mega-trends. Hence, only a limited number of publications have explicitly reflected on the globalisation, postmodernisation and neoliberalisation of such cities of "secondary" importance. And among the few accounts of secondary cities outside the West, those on sub-Saharan Africa, often by anthropologists,[45] still seem more numerous than similar studies on the MENA region from diverse disciplines (section 7).

2.2. Secondary cities as port and border cities

Among secondary cities, special attention should be directed to port and border cities whose function and location make them particularly apt to take key positions and gateway roles in specific regional and transregional networks and

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42. As long as we stick to fixed established "meta-geographies" of world-regions, "transregional" means transcending conventional regional limits. However, if we consider inductively alternative regional areas, the suffix "trans" will become obsolete. Especially for transregional links of the MENA region, cf. Steffen Wippel and Andrea Fischer-Tahir (eds.), *Jenseits etablierter Meta-Geographien: Der Nahe Osten und Nordafrika in transregionaler Perspektive* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2018)

43. For the latter, see examples in the Islamic world like Medina, Bethlehem, Qom and Timbuktu. Cp. Roberts, *Managing Systems*, 34-5.

44. Cf. Christophe Demaziere, "Le traitement des petites et moyennes villes par les études urbaines," *Espaces et sociétés* 168-169, 1 (2017): 17-32, for state-fostered research in France.

45. See, e.g., Hélène Mainet and Sylvain Racaud, "Secondary Towns in Globalization: Lessons from East Africa," *Articulo, Journal of Urban Research* 12 (2015), http://articulo.revues.org/2880, accessed 13 Apr. 2016; Hélène Mainet and Ephantus Kihonge, "Les villes secondaires dans les relations villes-campagnes en Afrique de l'Est: Territoire en mouvement," *Revue de géographie et aménagement* 27-28 (2015), http://tem.revues.org/2938, accessed 10 Dec. 2015. Cp. also previously mentioned references.

flows – even if they are of modest demographic and economic size and belong to a second tier in city ranking.

Recent research on port cities, in particular, is strongly related to the debate on the globalisation of trade. The restructuring of maritime transport in favour of containerised trade has accompanied the emergence of huge transhipment hubs in the most recent decades.[46] But there is also an increasing divergence of importance between cities and ports in the global city and port systems, respectively. While in the past, big ports were mostly located in the centre of (world) cities and closely connected spatially and functionally with local economies and societies, today, they are increasingly shifting to urban peripheries and are annexed to minor urban centres. Thus, today, big ports do not necessarily equate to big cities any more.[47] While ports are leaving central urban areas, intra-urban waterfronts are also being upgraded and transformed, which combines elements of globalising, neoliberal and postmodern development.[48]

Simultaneously, borderland and border city research shows that borders can still be conceived as barriers to trade and exchange that disadvantage peripheralised places located close to them. But more often, borders also offer opportunities to exploit territorial differentials, e.g. in resource endowments, social and political conditions, economic regulations etc.[49] Hence, Lawrence Herzog and Christophe Sohn plead to conceive borders beyond the logic of purely open or closed, but as exhibiting differentiated filtering practices and selective permeability.[50] Border cities can rise to become important crossing points and hubs for formal and informal, material and human flows, linking nations, regions and continents. "Frontier towns" constitute a specific category of cities as stopovers leading to not yet fixed and/or expanding (and sometimes

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46. Cf. Antoine Frémont, "Global Maritime Networks: The Case of Maersk," *Journal of Transport Geography* 15 (2007): 431-42.

47. For port-city interactions, cf. César Ducruet, "Approche comparée du développement des villes-ports à l'échelle mondiale: Problèmes conceptuels et méthodologiques," *Cahiers Scientifiques du Transport* 48 (2005): 59-79; Theo E. Notteboom and Jean-Paul Rodrigue, "Port Regionalization: Towards a New Phase in Port Development," *Maritime Policy and Management* 32, 3, (2005): 297-313; Waltraud Kokot, Mijal Gandelsman-Trier, Kathrin Wildner and Astrid Wonneberger (eds.), *Port Cities as Areas of Transition: Ethnographic Perspectives* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2008).

48. Cf. also Brian Hoyle, "Global and Local Change on the Port-City Waterfront," *Geographical Review* 90, 3 (2000): 395-417; Claude Prelorenzo, "Le retour de la ville portuaire," *Cahiers de la Méditerranée* 80 (2010): 157-67.

49. On border situations and practices, cf., for instance, Christophe Sohn and Julien Licheron, *From Barrier to Resource? Modelling the Border Effects on Metropolitan Functions in Europe* (Luxembourg: LISER, 2015); Donna K. Flynn, " 'We are the Border.' Identity, Exchange, and the State along the Benin-Nigeria Border," *American Ethnologist* 24, 2 (1997): 311-30; Paul Nugent, "Border Towns and Cities in Comparative Perspective," in *A Companion to Border Studies*, ed. Thomas M. Wilson and Hastings Donnan, (Chichester: Blackwell, 2012), 557-72; Noureddine El Aoufi and Michel Peraldi, "Introduction à l'analyse des économies frontalières: Eléments pour un programme de recherche transdisciplinaire," *Critique économique* 25 (2009): 5-13.

50. Cf. Lawrence A. Herzog and Christophe Sohn, *The Co-mingling of Bordering Dynamics in the San Diego-Tijuana Crossborder Metropolis* (Luxembourg: LISER, 2016).

receding) demographic, economic and military borders in the context of empire- and nation-building.[51]

3. Presentation of Case Studies

Case study	Country	Administrative capital of highest subnational unit*	Name
Tangier	Kingdom of Morocco	Region/*Jiha* (12)	Tanger-Tétouan-Al Hoceïma**
Salalah	Sultanate of Oman	Governorate/*Muḥāfaẓa* (11)	Dhofar
Edirne	Republic of Turkey	Province/*İl* (81)	Edirne

Fig. 2: Territorial situation of Tangier, Salalah and Edirne
* In brackets: number of units. ** 1997-2015: Tanger-Tétouan (16 regions).
(Author's compilation).

To fill this research gap, in the following part, I will refer mainly to three case studies at different ends of the MENA region, on which I have worked separately and to various degrees in recent years. They will now be brought together in a comparative perspective and against the common conceptual background sketched above. The three examples are Tangier, Morocco, Salalah in Oman and Edirne, Turkey, which are all administrative capitals at the highest subnational level in their respective countries, (fig. 2).[52] After a short presentation of these three cities in demographic, economic and historical terms, I will exemplarily concentrate on similar developments linked to their globalisation, such as the expansion of transport infrastructure and trade linkages, and then complete this by some additional remarks on the role of human mobilities and on general urban development and branding. The subsequent final section will present a few additional selected cases from existing literature.

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51. Cf. Jay Gitlin, Barbara Berglund and Adam Arenson (eds.), *Frontier Cities: Encounters at the Crossroads of Empire* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013).

52. Accordingly, explanations in the following sections without further reference are largely based on the author's own published research, e.g., on Tangier, in Steffen Wippel, "Re-Developing Tangier: The Globalisation of a Secondary City and its Local Consequences," *Trialog: A Journal for Planning and Building in a Global Context* 135, 4 (2018 [2020]): 4-11, and Steffen Wippel, "Stadtentwicklung in Tanger (Marokko): Rekonfigurationen des Urbanen im neoliberalen Kontext," in *Neoliberale Urbanisierung: Stadtentwicklungsprozesse in der arabischen Welt*, ed. Nadine Scharfenort, Ala Al-Hamarneh and Jonas Margraff (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2019), 33-74; Dieter Haller, Steffen Wippel and Helmut Reifeld (eds.), *Focus sur Tanger: Là où l'Afrique et l'Europe se rencontrent* (Rabat: KAS, 2016). http://www.kas.de/marokko/fr/publications/46222, accessed 24 Oct. 2018; on Salalah, in Steffen Wippel, "Développement et fragmentation d'une ville moyenne en cours de mondialisation: le cas de Salalah (Oman)," *Arabian Humanities* 2, 2013. http://cy.revues.org/2599, accessed 21 Aug. 2014; and *Salalah*; and, finally, Steffen Wippel, "Edirne as a Secondary City: Global Reconfigurations of the Urban," in *The Heritage of Edirne in Ottoman and Turkish Times: Continuities, Disruptions and Reconnections*, ed. Birgit Krawietz and Florian Riedler (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2020), 484-533; all of which provide more bibliographic details.

City	Year	Population	National rank	Primate city	% of primate city
Tangier	2019	1,063,000	3 or 4*	Casablanca	30%
Salalah	2018	368,159**	2	Muscat Capital Area	25%
Edirne	2018	167,443	50	İstanbul	1%

Fig. 3: Demographic comparison of the three cities
* Depending on whether Rabat and Salé are considered separately or as one conurbation. ** On *wilāya* level. (Sources: "City Population: Population statistics for countries, administrative divisions, cities, urban areas and agglomerations," https://www.citypopulation.de/, accessed 24 Jan. 2020; Salalah: National Centre for Statistics and Information, "Population-Data Portal," https://data.gov.om/OMPOP2016/population?region=1000100-wilayat-salalah, accessed 20 Jan. 2020).

The population of the three cities under study varies between fewer than 200,000 inhabitants for Edirne and about 1 million in Tangier, (fig. 3). Notably, Tangier and Salalah have experienced rapid growth in the last few decades, (fig. 4). In the national context, depending on how one counts, Salalah ranks second after the Muscat Capital Area, and Tangier is the third or fourth Moroccan agglomeration, whereas Edirne only comes in at 50th place in the Turkish context, with an enormous population gap compared with nearby İstanbul. Economically, Tangier developed into Morocco's second industrial pole, after Casablanca (or the central development axis between El Jadida and Kénitra); Salalah can be considered the third economic centre in Oman. In contrast, Edirne is in fact relatively prosperous, but in absolute terms lags far behind many much bigger agglomerations in Turkey (rank 41 in Turkish provincial GDP).[53]

All three cities are situated on the peripheries of their respective countries, yet Edirne has increasingly integrated itself within the wider orbit of the İstanbul megalopolis. In modern national history, Tangier and Salalah in particular were long neglected by national governments, mostly for political motives, as their areas were considered to be rebellious or fought civil wars against the centre. They only returned to the focus of interest in the course of the 1990s, mainly with the objective of reducing intra-state development gaps. Tangier and Salalah are located directly on the coast (Atlantic and Mediterranean; Indian Ocean), while Edirne's fluvial access to the Sea of Marmara is no longer navigable, (fig. 5). Tangier and Edirne can also be regarded as towns at international borders that

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53. In 2017, the Tangier region produced 10.5% of national GDP (rank 3 out of 12 regions), but 13.6% of added value in the secondary sector (rank 2/12); Edirne province had a share of 0.4% in national GDP. (Sources: Turkey: Turkstat, compiled by Wikipedia, "List of Turkish provinces by GDP," https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Turkish_provinces_by_GDP, accessed 22 Jan. 2020; Morocco: Haut-Commissariat au Plan, "Note d'information relative aux comptes régionaux de l'année 2017," https://www.hcp.ma/attachment/1696210/, accessed 25 Jan. 2020. Disaggregated data for Oman was not available).

simultaneously constitute important bloc borders (with the EU's Economic and Schengen Areas) and borders perceived as continental delimitations (between Africa, on the one hand, and Asia and Europe respectively, on the other), with pervasive effects on contacts, circulation and hinterlands. But remote Salalah is not far from a sensitive international border, either. Historically, these borders oscillated, even moved across the cities, and have been fixed only lately.[54]


Fig. 4: Population growth (1980-2019).
Population trends as dotted line. Various sources, accessed 24 Jan. 2020.

City	Distance to national (economic) capital	Distance to the sea	Distance to border	National border	Block border
Tangier	250 km (Casablanca 340 km)	0 km	0 km (sea); 70 km (land)	Spain; Gibraltar (UK)	EU (ES: Schengen)
Salalah	1,020 km	0 km	160 km	Yemen	GCC
Edirne	690 km (İstanbul 240 km)	130 km	0 km (GR); 20 km (BG)	Greece; Bulgaria	EU (GR: Schengen)

Fig. 5: Distance to borders and seas.
GCC: Gulf Cooperation Council. Various sources, accessed 24 Jan. 2020.

54. For Edirne, see maps in Wippel, "Edirne," 517 and "Bulgaria in the borders after the Treaties of Constantinople, San Stefano, Berlin, London, Bucharest, and Neuilly (1876-1919)," http://www.archives.government.bg/images/karta.jpg, accessed 3 Dec. 2015.

None of the three cities appears even in the largest rankings of world cities established by the GaWC research network. But longitudinal studies show that, historically, the status of such secondary cities can change considerably over time and can experience substantial ups and downs. All three cities have roots in Antiquity (Tingis; Hadrianopolis; Sumhuram and Al Baleed). Intermittently, Edirne was the Ottoman capital in the 15th century and shared central state functions with Bursa and İstanbul afterward.[55] For a long time, it was an important frontier town on the military and trade route from Anatolia to the Balkans. Like other Moroccan port cities, Tangier had a traditional role at the interface between (trans-Saharan) land and (trans-Mediterranean) sea transport. In the 19th century, it was Morocco's diplomatic capital and, for some years, the Sultanate's most important gateway and harbour.[56] Subsequently, it had a primordial role as a discrete International Zone under the special administration of a directorate of about ten Western powers. And, in the ancient world, the area around today's Salalah was an important centre for harvesting and commercialising frankincense, a precious commodity at that time, which was traded from the Roman Empire to India and, along the maritime Silk Road, as far as China.[57]

4. (Trans)Regional Transport Infrastructure and Trade Connections

4.1. Global container trade connections

All three cities have become increasingly integrated into far-reaching regional and transregional transport schemes that have triggered important trade connections in recent years. Most prominent was the building of exceptionally huge ports in Tangier and Salalah. The elaboration of strategies aiming at compensating for the lagging economic development of the Moroccan northern and the Omani southern provinces started in the 1990s and focussed strongly on port development – projects that had already been envisaged earlier, but not realised. This aimed not only at reducing intra-state development gaps, but also at integrating nationwide development programs targeting the diversification and opening of the national economy under neoliberal conditions.

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55. Cf. also Birgit Krawietz and Florian Riedler (eds.), *The Heritage of Edirne in Ottoman and Turkish Times: Continuities, Disruptions and Reconnections* (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2020), passim.

56. See, for example, Graham H. Stuart, *The International City of Tangier*. 2nd ed., (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955).

57. The harbour of Sumhuram (now Khor Rori; 4th century BC-5th century AD), 30 kilometres east of Salalah, preceded Al Baleed (8th century-16th century AD) in the core of today's town. Cf. UNESCO World Heritage Centre, "Land of Frankincense," http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1010, accessed 4 Mar. 2020.

Fig. 6: Global container trade connections
a) Port of Salalah
b) Tanger Méditerranée

* Shenzhen comprises the ports of Chiwan, Shekou and Yantian. ** On all courses, with only one call counted per course (round trip); mostly weekly.

Named places: at least world rank 40 or four (Salalah) or five (Tangier) calls. A.D.: Abu Dhabi; B.: Barcelona; BHV: Bremerhaven; KAEC: King Abdullah Economic City.; M.: Marseille/Fos-sur-Mer. Note: Frequencies can vary considerably from one year to the next due the continuous rescheduling of ports of call along existing lines. (Sources: Websites of shipping companies (Salalah); Tanger Med Port Authority, "Connexions Maritimes," http://www.tmpa.ma/en/connexions-maritimes/conteneurs/?cnx=conteneurs, accessed 2 Mar. 2020 (Tangier); Lloyd's List, "One Hundred Ports 2019," Digital edition, https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.informa.com/one-hundred-container-ports-2019/Digital%20edition, accessed 13 Mar. 2020. Design and cartography: Steffen Wippel, 2020).

The new ports opened in 1998 in Salalah and ten years later in Tangier. Both are located at the periphery of the existing urban agglomerations and have a strong focus on container trade. From the beginning, they had ambitious plans for further expansion. Both ports are strategically located on the world's most important sea trade route running from Eastern Asia through the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean to North-Western Europe and the American East Coast. They link with the most eminent ports worldwide and offer numerous feeder services to adjacent regions, notably to the eastern and western coastlines of Africa, but also to Latin America, (fig. 6).[58] Simultaneously, this also combined with national endeavours to become global trade hubs and should support policies of economic regionalisation, which oriented transregionally across the Mediterranean and the Sahara in Morocco, and around the Persian Gulf and towards the Indian Ocean region in Oman.[59]

Both ports showed strong initial growth. *Tanger Méditerranée* rapidly reached saturation for a number of years, but container throughput soared by nearly 40% again from 3.5 to 4.8 million standard containers (twenty-foot equivalent units or TEU) when a new terminal opened in 2019, (fig. 7).[60] In recent years, the port oscillated around rank 50 worldwide, (2018: rank 47; fig. 8); now, it endeavours to reach rank 20 in the foreseeable future. Despite fierce competition, particularly in the Western Mediterranean (e.g. from Valencia, Algeciras,[61] Barcelona etc.; cp. fig. 19), it has become the first container port on

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58. For more details on the development and connections of the two ports, cf. also Nora Mareï and Steffen Wippel, "Une perspective urbaine de la régionalisation du monde: Tanger, une métropole (eur) africaine," *Belgeo: Revue Belge de Géographie* 4 (2020), (forthcoming). http://journals.openedition.org/belgeo/39166; Steffen Wippel, "Stadt und Hafen Salalah: ein Hub im Indischen Ozean," *Geographische Rundschau* 4 (2020): 16-21.

59. Cf. Steffen Wippel, "Marokko in globalen und regionalen grenzüberschreitenden Handelsströmen," in *Alltagsmobilitäten: Aufbruch marokkanischer Lebenswelten*, ed. Ingo Breuer and Jörg Gertel (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2012), 241-65; Nora Mareï and Olivier Ninot, "Entre Afrique du Nord et de l'Ouest, les relations transsahariennes à un moment charnière," *Bulletin de l'association de géographes français* 95, 2 (2018): 277-96, for Morocco; Steffen Wippel, "Sindbad the Sailor revived? Oman and its Indian Ocean Links," in *The Transnational Middle East: Places, People, Borders*, ed. Leïla Vignal (Abingdon, New York: Routledge, 2017), 122-47, in the Omani case. This has been partially institutionalised in the Euromed partnership and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) (including the 2017 request to join the Economic Community of West African States/ECOWAS as a full member), and in the GCC and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), respectively.

60. A fourth terminal will open in 2020 or 2021 and push annual capacity to more than 9 million TEU. Compared with Tangier (2017: 3.3 million TEU), mostly inland-bound traffic at the other two Moroccan container ports was much lower (Casablanca: 987,000; Agadir: 203,000 TEU). Source: HCP, *Annuaire*, 226.

61. Algeciras (rank 33; 4.8 million TEU, in 2018), located at the directly opposite side of the narrow Strait of Gibraltar, had entered the container business very early, in the mid-1970s, and is in strong competition (and partly cooperation) with the new port of Tangier. Cf. also Nora Mareï, "Le détroit de Gibraltar dans la mondialisation des transports maritimes: Capter les circulations marchandes pour créer du développement," *EchoGéo* 19 (2012). http://echogeo.revues.org/12919, accessed 22 Oct. 2015; Carolin Alfonso, "'Gateway' City and Nexus Between Two Continents: The Port City of Algeciras," in *Port Cities as Areas of Transition: Ethnographic Perspectives*, ed. Waltraud Kokot, Mijal Gandelsman-Trier, Kathrin Wildner and Astrid Wonneberger (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2008), 111-23.

the African continent (since 2014, advancing Durban and, since 2016, Port Said), and now has the largest capacity in the entire Mediterranean region.[62]


Fig. 7: Annual container throughput (Sources: Lloyd's List, "One Hundred Ports 2019," Digital edition, https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.informa.com/one-hundred-container-ports-2019/Digital%20edition, accessed 13 Mar. 2020; Lloyd's List, *One Hundred Ports* and previous editions).

In contrast, throughput in the *Port of Salalah* could not fully realise its potential and stumbled from 2010 on, due to increasing competition from other expanding and newly built ports in its wider surroundings (from western India through the Arabian Peninsula to north-eastern Africa),[63] global economic crises, regional political tensions and natural disasters.[64] Not until 2019 did it reach a new record of 4.1 million TEU annually, (fig. 7). In the first ten years, the port rapidly rose to place 30 in the global ranking, but fell to rank 51 again by 2018, (fig. 8, 19). Therefore, over the last decade, the latest expansion projects have been put on hold. Yet, Salalah is still the sixth-largest port in the western Indian Ocean.

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62. For maritime trade, the inland city of Edirne depends very much on the (container) ports of the İstanbul metropolitan area, among them Ambarlı, which ranked 54 worldwide and had an annual throughput of 3.1 million TEU in 2018, (fig. 19). The closer new Asyaport near Tekirdağ is expected to become the main Turkish transhipment hub. For Port Said, Egypt (rank 57; 3.1 million TEU), cf. section 7.

63. Besides the ports among the world Top 100 listed below, (fig. 19), there are newly emerging ports like Sohar and Duqm in Oman itself, but also Djibouti, Kochi, Doha, Gwadar, Lamu and others more.

64. Besides Indian Ocean piracy, recurrent cyclones that led to port damage and temporary closure and the danger of tsunamis have affected the port of Salalah.

Fig. 8: World rank among container ports (Sources: https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.
informa.com/one-hundred-container-ports- 2019/Digital%20edition, accessed 13 Mar. 2020;
Lloyd's List, One Hundred Ports and previous editions).

APM Terminals, one of the largest terminal operators worldwide, is the only port operator and the biggest stakeholder in the port company of Salalah; in Tangier, it runs two of the currently three existing container terminals. Mærsk Line, the world's largest container shipping company that belongs to the same holding, is by far the main customer in both ports; conversely, these two hubs count among the most important in Mærsk's integrated global network.[65] Both ports also helped to push their respective country's global liner shipping connectivity considerably, (fig. 9). They developed into nearly pure "transhipment hubs," where freight primarily is reloaded only between container vessels, with very few connections to their terrestrial hinterlands. Salalah's transhipment rate, with more than 98% in 2009, still occupies the world's top position, while Tangier (95% in 2017) performs only slightly better.[66]

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65. For Salalah (and, then, Algeciras), cf. already Frémont, "Global Maritime Networks."

66. Eric Heymann, *Container Shipping: Successful Turnaround*. Frankfurt am Main: Deutsche Bank Research, 28 Mar 2011. www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_DE-PROD/ PROD0000000000271589.pdf, accessed 25 May 2011; HCP, *Annuaire*, 223.

Country	2006	2018	Port	2006	2018
Morocco	12	65	TangerMed	–*	60
Oman	23	54	Salalah	19	50
Egypt	47	62	Port Said	39	54
Turkey	31	56	Ambarlı	16	45

Fig. 9: Liner shipping connectivity index
* Tanger Ville: 4; TangerMed: 21 (2008).
Maximum: 2006=100. Source: UNCTAD, "Liner shipping connectivity index, annual" and "Port liner shipping connectivity index, annual," https://unctadstat.unctad.org, accessed 31 Aug. 2019.

In addition, both harbours encompass important other port installations. Especially in Salalah, general cargo has developed much more continuously and stronger than container trade, particularly in the last decade (16.3 million tons in 2019).[67] In the early 2010s, it became a central base for combatting pervasive maritime piracy in the north-western Indian Ocean and, later, a gateway for humanitarian aid to war-torn South Yemen. Tangier, besides being an important port for bulk traffic, too (2019: 6.6 million tons), is Morocco's busiest ferry harbour for the transit of people, goods and vehicles from and to Europe (about 2.8 million passengers, 700,000 cars and 360,000 trucks); the terminal for the worldwide export of newly produced cars, mostly from the Renault-Nissan plant in the nearby Tangier Automotive City, is another significant facility that has expanded rapidly (500,000 vehicles p.a.).[68]

4.2. Terrestrial transport infrastructure and transregional connections

The establishment of new port infrastructure and incorporation in global maritime trade circuits constitute but one aspect of these secondary cities' integration into far-reaching connections and flows. Terrestrial infrastructure has also been expanded or is being planned, notably to connect Tangier and Edirne. Both are by far the most important terrestrial border crossings in their respective countries.[69] New roads and railways, including high-speed lines, should not

67. Port of Salalah, *Directors Report for the Year Ended 31ˢᵗ December 2019* (Salalah: Salalah Port Services Co., 12 Feb 2020). http://www.salalahport.com/userfiles/Q4-2019-En.jpg, 22 Apr. 2020.

68. TMPA, *2019 Port Activity Report*. Press release. ([Tangier:] Tanger Med Port Authority, 20 Jan 2020). https://www.tangermed.ma/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/CP_TMPA_Bilan-de-lactivitei-portuaire-2019_VEN_20.01.2020-F.pdf, accessed 22 Apr. 2020

69. The border crossings around Edirne accounted for 37% of all vehicles crossing Turkey's land borders in 2014; the share of travellers (9 million) by road and rail was nearly 46%. The Kapıkule-Kapitan Andreevo border crossing with Bulgaria has been considered Europe's busiest land border crossing (Wippel, "Edirne," 516). Approximately five million travellers annually cross the Tangier Peninsula via the ports of Tangier and Ceuta (Wippel, "Re-Developing," 8). In 2018, 77% of the tourist arrivals via sea and land routes in Morocco passed through the area (Ministère du Tourisme, "Arrivées des touristes," https://www.tourisme.gov.ma/fr/tourisme-en-chiffres/arrivees-des-touristes, accessed 30 Apr. 2020); for the annual summer holiday *Marhaba* campaign for Moroccans living abroad,

only improve the links of these places at state peripheries with their national centres, but also embed them in regional and transregional cross-border transport schemes. Up to now, these long-term international programs have been only partially realised; in part they are still under construction or point to a future of varying potential feasibility.

In Morocco, national motorways and expressways built in the last decade (especially the Agadir-Tangier *autoroute*) and new railways, including the recently inaugurated high-speed line (TGV Casablanca-Tanger, opened in late 2018), connect to the expanding Trans-European Networks on the Iberian Peninsula via the ports of Tangier, (fig. 10a). The long-envisaged tunnel under the Strait of Gibraltar, whose realisation is still quite questionable, would further improve this connection.[70] The Tangier Peninsula is also integrated in common Euro-Mediterranean infrastructure projects and trans-Maghrebian rail and road strategies. The trans-Saharan Tangier-Dakar highway, opened more than a decade ago, connects it to pan-African networks: among other things, it has become an increasingly important route for overland transport to Western Africa of goods unloaded at TangerMed port.[71]

In Turkey, Edirne is connected to the main centres via an increasing number of motorways (namely, the İstanbul-Kapıkule motorway crosses the Bosporus bridges to connect to other cities in Anatolia); the construction of a high-speed rail line from İstanbul to the Bulgarian border started in 2019. As with Tangier, these connections integrate the city in several European, Black Sea, Euro-Mediterranean and Asian road and railway programs, (fig. 10b). With that, Edirne is about to become a major transit place and border crossing, especially on the land route, the "Iron Silk Road," between China, Central Asia, the Balkans and Western Europe.[72] To this we can add the development of the Tangier Peninsula into an energy hub for natural gas and electric power between the Maghreb, Europe and, potentially, sub-Saharan Africa; Eastern Thrace, at the same time, has started to become a transit area where gas pipelines should connect East (Russia, Iran, the Middle East) and West (Balkans, Italy, Central Europe).

TangerMed was the first (28%) passage point, while the Ceuta land crossing was at the third, the port of *Tanger Ville* at the fifth nationwide position (Douane, *Rapport d'activité 2018* (Rabat: Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances, Administration des Douanes et Impôts Indirects, n.d.), 76-8. http://www.douane.gov.ma/dms/loadDocument?documentId=78767, accessed 1 May 2020).

70. Cf. also Steffen Wippel, "Die 'feste Verbindung' mit Europa: Infrastrukturprojekte über die Straße von Gibraltar und ihre symbolische Bedeutung für die regionalen Zugehörigkeiten Marokkos," *asien afrika lateinamerika* 28, 6 (2000): 631-76.

71. Cf. also Laurence Marfaing and Steffen Wippel, "Die Öffnung der Landverbindung Dakar-Tanger und die Wiederbelebung transsaharischer Bewegungen," *comparativ, Leipziger Beiträge zur Universalgeschichte und vergleichenden Gesellschaftsforschung* 15, 4 (2005): 109-40; Mareï and Ninot, "Entre Afrique du Nord," 251-53; Mareï and Wippel, "Une perspective."

72. Cf. also Krawietz and Riedler (eds.), *The Heritage*, passim.

Mediterranean Bypass (*Rocade méditerranéenne*)
TEN-T: Trans-European Transport Networks
Trans-Mediterranean Transport Network
Trans-Maghreb Motorway
Tangier-Dakar Highway ("Eurafrican Highway")
TAH: Trans-African Highway
TAH 1: former Saharan alignment
TAH 1: Missing links
Secondary trans-African highways
High-speed railway lines
Maghrebian high-speed line project
Motorways of the Sea (European Union)
Major global maritime routes

TEM: Trans-Turkey Highway (part of the Trans-European Motorway Network)
TEN-T: Trans-European Transport Network
E: European Roads
TMN-T: Trans-Mediterranean Transport Network
AH: Asian Highway Network
ECO: ECO Road Corridors
M: Arab Mashreq International Road Network
BSRH: Black Sea Ring Highway
Railway lines *(existing and planned)*

Fig. 10: Terrestrial transport infrastructure and transregional connections
a) Infrastructure and connections around Tangier; b) Infrastructure and connections through Edirne; c) Infrastructure and connections around Salalah (Design and cartography: Steffen Wippel, 2019 and 2020).

Finally, Salalah, which did not receive its first tarmacked inland connection until 1982, is now envisioned as also integrating Gulf, Mashreq and Arab transport schemes to improve road and establish rail links and connect with wider Asian and African corridors, (fig. 10c). While the trans-Oman and trans-Gulf railway projects have been continually redesigned and have experienced considerable delays, another visionary megaproject, a fixed link across the Bab El Mandab to join the Horn of Africa, is blocked for the moment due to war in Yemen, but seems unfeasible also for economic and financial reasons.

Thus ports, roads and rails increasingly connect our secondary cities to adjacent states, neighbouring regions and faraway destinations and make them important hubs on trade and transport circuits. Compared to that, air services are of much lesser importance, even if Tangier and Salalah also expanded their airports and have attracted flights to Arab neighbours, to Europe and, in Salalah's case, to destinations in southern India, but the number of connections and passengers is still limited compared with other airports in their countries, (fig. 11). Edirne still has no own airport with line operation, even if construction was once announced; the city remains in the catchment area of İstanbul's mega-airports.

Airport	Passengers (million)	National rank
Tangier	1.1	5
Casablanca	9.4	1
Salalah	1.5	2
Muscat	14.0	1

Fig. 11: Airport traffic (2017)
(Sources: HCP, *Annuaire*, 221; NSCI, *Statistical Yearbook*, 263).

Yet, the unfolding of many transportation projects still can be hindered not only by financial conditions and economic risks, but also by political circumstances – such as tense relations with neighbours, e.g. between Morocco and Algeria, Oman and the UAE or Turkey and Greece; the situation in adjacent countries, like political unrest in Yemen; or regional bloc policies that open or close borders for free trade and circulation with the EU, the Arab world or the GCC.[73] All in all, concerning transport and trade links, Tangier seems to have made the most progress in recent years, while Edirne is also advancing quickly, both with substantial technical and financial support from international donors (such as regional organisations, funds and banks and bilateral development aid). In contrast, Salalah, the most remote of the three cities in national and regional contexts, is lagging behind.

In addition, official trade along these expanded transport corridors is supplemented by more informal flows. Tangier in particular is a hub on important transcontinental trade routes for smuggling diverse commodities, from daily amenities from Spain to used cars from Western Europe to the South and soft and hard drugs from Northern Morocco, Latin America and Central Asia to the North.

5. Human Mobilities

We can observe a similar duality of the formal and the informal when it comes to human circulation. Traditionally, all three cities boast their ethnically and culturally mixed population and the "cosmopolitanism" of the past. However, things changed considerably on the way to the modern nation state. Edirne and Tangier in particular lost many of their non-Muslim and non-national inhabitants. In Edirne, in the course of the wars and peace agreements in the Balkans (1878-1920) and the establishment of the Turkish Republic (1923), Orthodox Christian Greeks, Bulgarians and Armenians were displaced

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73. Whereas, in the long run, free trade of commodities has been increasingly expanded, e.g. in the Euromed association agreements or the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), the free circulation of people experienced oscillating policies between hesitant liberalisation and growing restrictions.

or had to flee. Tangier, after its gradual post-independence reintegration into the Moroccan nation state (1956-60), lost the majority of its European and Jewish inhabitants that constituted a large part of its population during the era of the International Zone (1923-56).

Nationality	2010			2018		
	Number	Share of local pop.	Share in national pop.	Number	Share of local pop.	Share in national pop.
Omani	93,560	60%	71%	143,085	39%	56%
Foreigners	61,749	40%	29%	225,074	61%	44%
Total	155,309	100%	100%	368,159	100%	100%

Fig. 12: Population composition in the Salalah District
(Sources: https://www.citypopulation.de, 20 Jan. 2020; NSCI, *Statistical Yearbook*, 73, 74, 80).

Today, Salalah has an extraordinarily large non-Omani population of about 60%, even well above the national average, (fig. 12). Besides northern Omanis, a migrant workforce (mostly South Asians) flocked in, particularly since investment soared in the city. In contrast, official figures on migrant population in Edirne and Tangier are low (< 1%). Yet, not only has the northern Moroccan metropolis become a destination for national migration due to its soaring economy, but during the Iberian economic crisis, workers from Spain started to look for job opportunities in the boom town south of the strait. Non-nationals from Europe and the Gulf also started to resettle in secondary (and main) residences in its surroundings and to gentrify its old medina. Since the end of the Cold War, relatively well-developed Edirne has become a shopping, culture and leisure destination for visitors from adjacent districts and towns in neighbouring countries. From the 1970s to the 1990s, many displaced Bulgarians of Turkish ethnicity arrived in the city, and in the following decades Bulgarian schools and Orthodox religious centres have begun to reopen in Edirne.

In thousand	Hotel guests			Hotel nights
Territorial units	Total	National	International	Total
Morocco	7,752	3,120	4,632	22,101
TTAH (region)	875 (4)	467 (2)	408 (5)	1,846 (4)
Tanger-Asilah (prefecture)	623 (4)	307 (3)	320 (5)	1,261 (4)
Oman	3,312	1,298	2,014	3,293

Dhofar (governorate)	381 (2)	115 (2)	266 (2)	491 (2)
Turkey	46,855	14,445	32,410	155,810
Edirne (province)	4,659 (3)	1,493 (2)	3,166 (3)	606 (31)

Fig. 13: Tourism arrivals and nights (2017)

Note: The table reflects only accommodation in registered hotels, but does not include establishments such as pensions, bed & breakfasts, or villa renting. In brackets: national rank. * TTAH: Tanger-Tétouan-Al Hoceïma. (Sources: HCP, *Annuaire*, 247-48; NSCI, *Statistical Yearbook*, 473-74; TÜIK Gösterge, "Statistical Indicators," https://biruni.tuik.gov. tr/ilgosterge/?locale=en, accessed 22 Apr. 2020).

Tourism is also booming in all three cities, which attract visitors of diverse European and Arab, Salalah also of Asian, origin, with their cultural heritages, leisure facilities and natural sceneries, (fig. 13). Nowadays, Edirne is the third-most toured city in Turkey, mostly for its Ottoman monuments (cf. also section 6) and predominantly by day excursionists. Salalah has recently established direct holiday air links with Europe and, together with the rest of the Dhofar governorate, is the second tourist destination in Oman. The Tangier region offers perhaps the most-faceted opportunities for cultural, seaside and rural tourism and is the fourth-most visited part of Morocco. Figures would be even higher if we include day trips of inhabitants and tourists from the southern Spanish coast for visiting and shopping.

Cruise terminals have been built or expanded for the expanding maritime tourism business in both the Port of Salalah and the old city harbour *Tanger Ville*. In all three cities, not only have visitors and residents from the Gulf states started to flock in,[74] but also companies have shown interest in investing in real estate and tourism projects (which have sometimes failed). But while tourists, consumers and workers easily commute to Tangier and Edirne from neighbouring countries, the gradual implementation of the Schengen Treaty since the 1990s made border crossing to adjacent EU regions more difficult for most of the local population in the two cities.

Both Tangier and Edirne also evolved into major hubs for irregular migration from the Global South to the EU, (fig. 14). In the 1990s, the Tangier region developed into a transit point for sub-Saharan migrants who wanted to take the passage across the Strait of Gibraltar (directly or via the Spanish *presidio* of Ceuta) and, temporarily, continued to Southern Morocco to pass to the Canary Islands; later migrants from South Asia and the Middle East also arrived at Morocco's northernmost tip. In the 2000s, tightening border controls

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74. In Salalah, during the rainy summer monsoon (*khareef*) travel season, tourists from GCC countries constitute the large majority of foreign visitors. In 2018, out of 826,000 visitors, 28% were non-Omanis, including 19% non-Omani GCC citizens (i.e. two-third of all foreigners). Source: National Centre for Statistics and Information, "Tourism-Data Portal," https://data.gov.om/dedblxg/tourism, accessed 22 Apr. 2020.

and maritime surveillance left them stuck in guesthouses in the old city and spontaneous camps in the surrounding maquis. Migration routes shifted to new corridors, but since 2017 partially returned to the peninsula, when these other routes, too, increasingly became impassable.


Fig. 14: Irregular migration across Spanish, Greek and Bulgarian borders

Note: Methods of counting differ from one source to the other. Data series are therefore not fully consistent. (Sources: de Haas, *Irregular Migration*, 62 (1993-2005); Amnesty International, *Fear and Fences*, 93-94 (2006-2008); Frontex, "Detections of illegal border-crossings statistics download (updated monthly)," https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/ Migratory_routes/2020/Monthly_detections_of_IBC_PRESS_20200205.xlsx, accessed 4 Mar. 2020 (2009-2019)).

The Edirne region has become another passage point to the EU. Since the late 2000s, and notably during the 2015 "refugee crisis," the city and its surroundings were a notorious passage point for Middle Eastern refugees, before reinforced EU controls and agreements with Turkey largely stopped clandestine border crossing. But in early 2020, Edirne and the nearby borders have become a transit zone for Syrian and Afghan refugees again. Walls and fences have been erected, both along North Morocco's land borders with Spain and large parts of East Thrace's borders with Greece and Bulgaria.

6. Rapid Urban Transformations and their Implications

Limited space allows me to add only a few supplementary remarks on further aspects of current urban processes linked to globalisation, neoliberalisation, postmodernity and, consequently, fragmentation. The establishment of translocal transport infrastructure and worldwide connections goes hand in hand with rapid urban transformation. Together with the construction of the two new world ports,

Tangier and Salalah in particular experienced hitherto unseen urban development, but Edirne likewise shows many changes in its current urbanscape.

Both port cities also opened large special economic (i.e. free, commercial, automotive, technological and logistical) zones, adjacent to the port of Salalah or scattered across the Tangier Peninsula. In both cases, they have shown slow and limited hinterland integration with the national economy, most strikingly in the Omani case. Instead, they focus on international investment and exporting products via the nearby ports. International firms (like Renault, Bosch, Adidas, 3M, DHL, Huawei, Siemens, Danone and Decathlon in Tangier;[75] Octal,[76] Oman Oil, Brakes India and DHL in Salalah) have established themselves in these zones and use them to serve regional and global markets. In contrast, already since the 1970s, Edirne experienced a progressive transformation towards labour-intensive and low-value manufacturing when İstanbul's industry gradually expanded to the west. As a relatively well-developed city, it benefits only to a limited extent from current national investment incentives, including the establishment of special economic zones.

In the 2000s, all three places experienced the establishment of their first shopping malls and the construction of gated communities; integrated tourism complexes have popped up along the seafront inside and close to Tangier and Salalah. Politically, already in the 1950s, Tangier was a meeting place for Maghrebian and, later, for Euro-Mediterranean conferences, and, since the 1960s, it was the headquarters of several African organisations.[77] Still today, palaces in Salalah and Tangier serve as their national rulers' summer residences. Edirne and Tangier host a number of foreign consulates. In both cases, cross-border cooperation at the EU periphery has started, albeit timidly and suffering from restrictions and setbacks.

The changing local urbanscape is also used to enhance globally recognised reputation and attractiveness. The cities and the large urban development projects located there are intensely marketed and branded, especially facilities that also serve touristic use like the holiday complexes and the new Tangier marina, but also industrial and infrastructural facilities like the ports and free zones. However, in contrast to Western and some prominent Southern world cities, efforts at urban branding are inconsistent and rather fragmentary. They show a mix of nation, city and project branding by local, national and international stakeholders, and

75. The *Tanger Free Zone* has been nominated several years consecutively as the most competitive free zone of Africa; the Renault-Nissan assembly site is considered Africa's biggest car manufacturing plant.

76. Octal is the largest manufacturer of PET resin in the Middle East and of integrated PET sheet worldwide.

77. This included the headquarters of the African Training and Research Centre in Administration for Development (CAFRAD) and of the Association of African Trade Promotion Organizations (AATPO), as well as the subregional office of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). Today, most of these organisations are defunct or have moved to the capital Rabat.

in part produce an eclectic image. Temporally, cultural heritage, a glorious and cosmopolitan past, brilliant prospects and a shining future are being used; geographically, there is a strategic positioning of places on important trade routes and at interfaces between several world regions, which are said to offer splendid economic opportunities. Compared with nearby world cities, local marketing emphasises not only bustling urban life, but also the relative calmness, the greenness and the rural surroundings of these places.

Place	Object	Year	Type
Edirne	Selimiye Mosque and Social Complex	Inscribed 2011	Cultural
Edirne	Kırkpınar Oil Wrestling Festival	Inscribed 2010	Intangible
Edirne province	The Bridge of Uzunköprü	Tentative 2015	Cultural
Edirne	Sultan Bayezid II Complex	Tentative 2016	Cultural
Edirne	Edirne's fried liver (Ciğer tava)	Local campaign 2017	Intangible
Salalah/Dhofar province	Land of Frankincense*	Inscribed 2000/2005	Cultural
Dhofar province	**Al-Bar'ah, music and dance of Dhofari valleys**	**Inscribed 2010**	**Intangible**
Tangier region**	Medina of Tétouan (Titawin)	Inscribed 1997	Cultural
Tangier region	Town of Lixus	Tentative 1995	Cultural
Tangier region	Belyounech	Tentative 1985-1994	Cultural
Tangier region	Chefchaouen	Tentative 1985-1994	Cultural
Tangier	Tangier's urban heritage	Nomination project 2016	Cultural

Fig. 15: UNESCO World Heritage

* Inscribed as "The Frankincense Trail" in 2000, renamed in 2005. Includes four places in the governorate of Dhofar: the archaeological sites of Khor Rori (close to Salalah), Al Baleed (inside today's Salalah) and Shisr (in the desert), as well as the Frankincense Park of Wadi Dawkah. ** Région Tanger-Tétouan-Al Hoceïma.

Inscribed on the definite list or still/formerly on the tentative list. Only place-specific intangible cultural heritage. Sources: Wikipedia, accessed 20 Jan. 2020; UNESCO World Heritage Centre, http://whc.unesco.org and UNESCO, "Intangible Cultural Heritage," https://ich.unesco.org/en, accessed 4 Mar. 2020; on liver: Birgit Krawietz, "Designing Edirne's Heritage Trail and Turkish Oil Wrestling," in The Heritage of Edirne in Ottoman and Turkish Times: Continuities, Disruptions and Reconnections, ed. Birgit Krawietz and Florian Riedler (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2020), 245.

Notably Edirne fructifies its outstanding material and intangible cultural Ottoman world heritage, and Salalah relies on its past as the "Land of Frankincense" and on its fecund tropical climate, (fig. 15). Tangier strategically communicates its cosmopolitan past and the historical presence of artists (mostly Western painters, musicians and writers in the XVIIIth and XXth centuries). In particular, it has some landmark architecture, like the new TGV train station, the TangerMed Business Centre designed by "starchitect" Jean Nouvel, the newly built marina and a refurbished corniche, which some passers-by claim give it a Dubai allure. Attention-drawing towers have been proposed for Tangier and Edirne, but either have not yet been realised, have been abandoned or have been built elsewhere, (fig. 16). Hence, aspects of "Dubaisation," i.e. the imaginary power of Gulf cities as urban and architectural models to emulate (not always successfully under local conditions) and the presence of Gulf developers and capital can be found in all three of these places. Tangier also shows a strong presence of Spanish developers and Salalah of Egyptian real estate investment, both suffering from economic and political deterioration in their home countries in the last decade.

All three cities regularly celebrate cultural festivals whose attractiveness transcends by far the municipal and national borders: Tangier organises an opulent sequence of international music, theatre, film and other cultural festivals referring to its Mediterranean, Andalusian, Maghrebian and African connections; it also worked hard to attract Expo 2012.[78] During the local summer monsoon season, Salalah holds the annual *Khareef Festival* that attracts masses of tourists, especially from other Gulf countries suffering from the summer heat (cf. section 5). And Edirne plays on its *Kırkpınar Oil Wrestling Festival*, which has become a UNESCO Intangible Cultural Heritage, and other food and cultural events.[79]

At the same time, all these installations contribute to considerable spatial (and concomitant social) fragmentation. Many of these places, like port areas, free zones, gated communities and tourist premises, are walled, fenced or otherwise spatially segregated, (fig. 17) and difficult to access for those without special permits or, like malls and marinas, without the necessary means. Often, central authorities implement projects without consultation on local needs and by ignoring local competencies. Especially in the Tangier case, the state has established special development agencies for planning and managing large areas

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78. It was among the last three competitors, yet the bid failed.
79. Cf. Krawietz and Riedler (eds.), *The Heritage*, especially Birgit Krawietz, "Designing Edirne's Heritage Trail and Turkish Oil Wrestling," in *The Heritage of Edirne in Ottoman and Turkish Times: Continuities, Disruptions and Reconnections*, ed. Birgit Krawietz and Florian Riedler (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2020), 233–82.

in the wider agglomeration.[80] For projects to remodel waterfronts in Tangier and Salalah, historical places and quarters had to be razed, to the discontent of many locals. In consequence, social protests have arisen regularly in Tangier and, there as well as in Salalah, demonstrations were among the strongest nationwide during the protest wave in the "Arab Spring." Reactive compensating programmes and supplementary urban policies, especially in Tangier, for more locally and socially focused changes, including actions for a "city without slums" and the building of residential and industrial "New Towns," did not really remedy continuing trends of urban globalisation, fragmentation and poor development.

Fig. 16: Ottoman heritage and landmark architecture in Edirne and Tangier
a) Selimiye Mosque, Edirne, 16th century, UNESCO cultural world heritage since 2011 (https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4e/Edirne_7333_Nevit.JPG, accessed 4 Mar. 2020); b) TGV Train station *Tanger Ville*, finished in 2019 and supplementing the new Neo-Moresque-style central station built in the 2000s (Photo: Steffen Wippel, 2020); c) Tangier Al Noor Tower project by Sheikh Tarek Mohamed Bin Laden 2015, initially planned for Casablanca, then for Tangier, finally abandoned (https://www.challenge.ma/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Projet-global-1.jpg, accessed 24 Apr. 2020); d) Edirne *Sedef Kule* (Mother of Pearl) tower project, planned close to the border triangle in the early 2010s, but not realised (http://www.merkeziisitmaproje.com.tr, accessed 2 Dec. 2015).

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80. For the "agencification" of urban governance in Morocco, cf. Maryame Amarouche and Koenraad Bogaert, "Reshaping Space and Time in Morocco: The Agencification of Urban Government and its Effects in the Bouregreg Valley (Rabat/Salé)," *Middle East-Topics and Arguments* 12 (2019): 44-54. https://meta-journal.net/issue/view/230, accessed 19 July 2019.

Fig. 17: Socio-spatial fragmentation in Salalah and Tangier
a) Fenced Salalah Methanol Company at Salalah Free Zone (Photo: Steffen Wippel, 2010); b) walled access road to Tanger Méditerranée port (© Steffen Wippel, 2013); c) walled individual Al Jannat Mansions, part of the Salalah Beach integrated tourism complex, under construction (Photo: Steffen Wippel, 2010); d) fenced gated community *Résidences Les Riads de la Baie* in Malabata, Tangier (© Steffen Wippel, 2013).

7. A Summary of Further Case Studies

A few studies deal with additional secondary cities in the MENA region, from Turkey through the Levant and Egypt to the Gulf and Iran, (fig. 18). They focus on their secondary role in the national urban systems and their incipient – and sometimes well-advanced – integration in the global economy, on neoliberal features and postmodern aspects, but also on disadvantageous social and spatial effects and resulting protests. These places are not uniformly called "secondary cities," but sometimes given similar designations.

City	Country	Year(s) of study	Population (in 1,000, rounded)	National rank	Year of data
Irbid	Jordan	1995	500	3	2015
Adana	Turkey	2004	1,740	5	2019
Port Said	Egypt	1995-2007	760	5	2018
Damietta	Egypt	2017	290	18	2018
Erbil	Iraq (Kurdistan)	2015, 2019	880	5	2018
Ras Al Khaimah	UAE (RAK)	2013	260	6	2015
Qom	Iran	2019	1,200	7	2016

Fig. 18: Further case studies of secondary cities in the Middle East and North Africa (Source: https://www.citypopulation.de, accessed 5 Mar. 2020).

Irbid, Jordan's "second city" (*ville seconde*), overshadowed by Amman, was not yet reached by ubiquitous processes of globalisation, neoliberalisation and postmodernisation in the early 1990s.[81] Then, the relatively young city, which had developed in the late 19th century, had even lost its role as a regional market and transport hub for the surrounding smaller towns that had become connected directly to the national capital, while traditional links to Haifa and Damascus were completely or partially cut. Irbid had become the victim of nation-state building and of geopolitical changes repercussive on relations with neighbouring states. Its reputation as a rebellious city dates back to local resistance since the 1920s against the installation of the Transjordanian monarchy; a tendency towards Arab nationalism, Syrian-style; and a strong pro-Palestinian stance. The latter culminated in the Fedayin proclaiming a local people's government in the "liberated city," which ended in the infamous 1970 Black September. Whereas this caused lasting neglect by the central government, Irbid profited from the money transfers and investments of its many emigrants during the oil boom. Only in the late 1980s did the central authorities take an interest in the city's evolution to rebalance national development and relieve overcrowded Amman.

In Turkey, Adana, the easternmost of the country's relatively developed conurbations, is presented as a case of a globalising "mid-rank city."[82] Already in the later 19th century, it was integrated in the world market as an important agro-industrial trade node and, in particular, a supplier of cotton from the plantations established by Ottoman and British investors in its hinterland. Exports passed through the nearby port of Mersin, (fig. 19) and in the early XXth century via the much-contested Baghdad Railway. In the Turkish Republic, Adana became a peripheral city and gradually declined in the second half of the XXth century. It notably suffered from shrinking public subsidies and investment resulting from the national economic crisis in the 1980s. To compensate for this, Adana successfully attracted international investors with its location at the crossroads of North-South and East-West trade routes. In particular, it became the Mediterranean outlet for CIS republics after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and a hub for hydrocarbon transport corridors. Yet, these globalisation effects also engendered important social problems and cleavages aggravated by inadequate centralised decision-making at the national level. Housing, education, jobs, migration and the informal economy had become major issues in the early 2000s.

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81. Cf. Marc Lavergne, "Ville seconde, ville soumise? Le cas d'Irbid (Jordanie)," *Cahiers de la Méditerranée* 51, 1 (1995): 53-69.

82. Cf. Fatma Unsal, "Globalization and the Mid-rank City: The Case of Adana, Turkey," *Cities* 21, 5 (2004): 439-49.

2018 rank*	million TEU	Port**	2008 rank*	million TEU	Port
1	42.0	*Shanghai* (α+)	1	29.9	*Singapore*
10 (1)	15.0	Jebel Ali, Dubai (α+)	6 (1)	11.8	Jebel Ali, Dubai
24	7.0	*Colombo* (γ+)	27	4.0	*Jawarhalal Nehru, Mumbai*
28	5.1	*Jawarhalal Nehru, Mumbai* (α)	28	3.7	*Colombo*
29	5.1	*Valencia* (β-)	29	3.6	*Valencia*
32	4.9	*Piraeus (Athens* β+)	31	3.5	*Gioia Tauro*
33	4.8	*Algeciras*	33 (2)	3.3	Jeddah
36	4.4	*Mundra*	34	3.3	*Algeciras*
40 (2)	4.1	Jeddah (β-)	35 (3)	3.3	**Port Said**
47 (3)	3.5	**TangerMed**	36 (4)	3.2	Ambarlı, İstanbul
48	3.4	*Barcelona* (α-)	38 (5)	3.1	**Salalah**
51 (4)	3.4	**Salalah**	45	2.6	*Barcelona*
52	3.3	*Marsaxlokk, Malta*	47 (6)	2.5	Khor Fakkan, Sharjah
54 (5)	3.2	Ambarlı, İstanbul (α)	50	2.3	*Malta Freeport*
57 (6)	3.1	**Port Said**	51	2.3	*Durban*
62	3.0	*Durban* (γ-)	60 (7)	2.0	Bandar Abbas
71	2.7	*Genoa* (sufficiency)	68	1.8	*Genoa*
79	2.3	*Gioia Tauro*	78	1.4	Las Palmas
82 (7)	2.3	King Abdullah Economic City	82 (8)	1.3	Alexandria
83	2.2	*Karachi* (β)	83 (9)	1.3	Haifa
86 (8)	2.0	Bandar Abbas	84 (10)	1.3	Dammam
87 (9)	2.0	Khor Fakkan, Sharjah	85	1.2	*La Spezia*
93	1.8	*Sines*	87 (11)	1.2	**Damietta**
95 (10)	1.7	Abu Dhabi (β)	88	1.2	*Karachi*
97 (11)	1.7	**Mersin**	100 (12)	0.9	Beirut
			[105] (13)	0.9	**TangerMed**

Fig. 19: MENA container ports in the world's top 100 league[83]
* World rank; in brackets: MENA rank. ** In brackets: Rating on the 2018 GaWC list.
Below the Top 100 (2008): Marseille 0.9; Mersin 0.9; Piraeus 0.4. Bold: The author's own and third-party studies mentioned in this article; in italics: World rank 1 port and other non-MENA ports.
(Sources: https://lloydslist.maritimeintelligence.informa.com/one-hundred-container-ports- 2019 /Digital%20edition, accessed 13 Mar. 2020; Cargo Systems, *Top 100;* https://www.lboro. ac.uk/gawc/world2018t.html, accessed 23 July 2019).

83. Including adjacent regions: the Mediterranean, the Western Indian Ocean and Africa.

At the eastern end of the Mediterranean, Port Said shows some similarities with Tangier.[84] While the city was established only in the course of the Suez Canal construction, it likewise constituted a quasi-extraterritorial, multi-ethnic city-state administered by the international canal company. Its economy concentrated on external transit and trade activities, and in the early 20th century, its port's throughput counted among the world's largest. Nationalisation in 1956 reduced Port Said's position from an "acting city of the world economy" (*cité agent de l'économie monde*) to a subnational administrative centre. The Six-Day War made it a "martyr city," but also sealed its economic decline.[85] Revitalisation of the city started following the liberal Infitah Policy of the 1970s, the establishment of the first Egyptian free zone and deconcentration policies to alleviate the Cairo megalopolis. However, the dream to make Port Said a future "Egyptian Hong Kong" or "Rotterdam of the Orient" that would benefit from Egypt's multiregional free trade policies seemed to have failed in the 1990s, when free zones had opened all over Egypt and traffic through the canal declined due to the growing size of vessels. Yet, new megaprojects have been established since then, including industrial zones and transport infrastructure. Globalisation has been fostered especially by the opening of a new container port east of the city in 2004. Today, it is considered the 57th terminal worldwide, (fig. 19; cf. also fig. 7-9); the "New Suez Canal" opened in 2015 nearly doubled the waterway's traffic capacity. Yet, socio-spatial fragmentation had become an issue already in the 2000s, and the new installations' demand for workforce has been rather limited.

Characterised as a "mesopolis," nearby Damietta is an outpost on the Nile Delta, just 70 kilometres west of Port Said.[86] Since Antiquity, the city, relatively isolated from the Egyptian hinterland, was oriented towards the outside world. It, too, has prospered again thanks to foreign investment and especially the establishment of a new large port, (including container facilities; cp. fig. 19) in the 1980s, which was envisioned to become one of the largest Mediterranean transit ports, as well. More recently, Damietta was about to become a regional hub for natural gas transport and exportation. However, contemporary global integration progressed to the detriment of established economic activities (such as the traditional furniture industry) and showed negative social and

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84. Cf. Galila El Kadi and Frédérique Bruyas, "Le devenir d'une ville de la Méditerranée: Port Saïd, de la mondialisation à la régionalisation," *Cahiers de la Méditerranée* 51, 1 (1995): 21-43.

85. Cf. also Frédérique Bruyas, " 'Mégaprojets' nationaux et dynamiques identitaires locales: Le cas de Port-Saïd et des autres villes du canal de Suez," in *Villes et urbanisation: Vers l'écoumènopolis?*, ed. Eric Denis (Le Caire, Paris: CEDEJ, Karthala, 2007), 291-327, and Frédérique Bruyas, "Port Saïd (Egypte), lieu d'articulation du local au mondial. Zone et ville franche: questions d'échelles," *Annales de Géographie* 109, 612 (2000): 152-71.

86. Cf. Marc Lavergne, "Damiette, une ville prospère d'Égypte au péril de la mondialisation," *Les Cahiers d'EMAM* 29 (2017). http://emam.revues.org/1390, accessed 3 Mar. 2017.

environmental effects causing repeated local mobilisation against the mega-projects' disaggregative character.

In Iraqi Kurdistan, Erbil struggles to develop from a peripheral place into an economic centre and to become a "new Dubai."[87] Building on a prosperous and cosmopolitan past as the "second city" in the Ottoman province (*vilâyet*) of Mosul and on relative peace and stability and a rentier economy after 2003, the autonomous government endeavoured to attract foreign investment, especially to Erbil. Mushrooming shopping malls became the material symbols of neoliberal transformation, socio-economic progress and successful integration in the global economic system and the overcoming of past oppression. Many other large urban development projects emulating the Dubai role model were started, including the spread of skyscrapers and gated communities. This profound reshaping of the urban form contrasted with the neglect of historical built structures and the marginalisation of urban spaces.[88] Yet, falling oil prices and the war with IS brutally halted the economic boom in 2014, and many development projects have been abandoned.

Ras Al Khaimah, the capital of the northernmost emirate of the UAE, experienced a recent boom as a "medium city" (*ville moyenne*).[89] The place has been settled since ancient times and is proud of a glorious past based on pearl diving and trade. Around 1900, it was the largest town in the British Trucial Coast. But unlike other UAE cities, it only recently showed enhanced ambitions for greater development projects. Since approximately the 1990s, Ras Al Khaimah has engaged in an industrialisation strategy that combines import substitution with international exports. It is based on local mining and advantageous energy prices, even if the small emirate itself is only a minuscule oil producer. In 2007, the nearby port opened a container terminal (capacity: 350,000 TEU),[90] and in the 2010s, an image and marketing campaign started to attract international investors to the local free zones and the real estate sector; construction adapted to the requirements of a global postmodern fascination economy. For many years, the city also benefited from close relationships with internationally increasingly isolated Iran. Despite specific historical characteristics, its temporal lag and its markedly smaller size, Ras Al Khaimah has been considered to be on the way to become a reduced version of nearby Dubai.

87. Cf. Schluwa Sama, "A Periphery Becomes a Center? Shopping Malls as Symbols of Modernity in Iraqi Kurdistan," *Middle East-Topics & Arguments* 5 (2015): 89-98. https://meta-journal.net/article/view/3642/3663, accessed 19 Nov. 2015; Thierry Boissière and Yoann Morvan, "Erbil: An Unfulfilled Dream of Urban Modernity," JADMAG, Jadaliyya in Print 6, 3 (2019): 14-8.

88. Cf. also Rebwar Ibrahim, Sabah Mushatat and Mohamed Gamal Abdelmonem, "Authenticity, Identity and Sustainability in Post-war Iraq: Reshaping the Urban Form of Erbil City," *Journal of Islamic Architecture* 3, 2 (2014): 58-68.

89. Cf. Brigitte Dumortier, "Ras al-Khaïmah, l'essor récent d'une ville moyenne du Golfe," *Arabian Humanities* 2 (2013). http://cy.revues.org/2575, accessed 21 Aug. 2014.

90. RAK Ports, "Container Cargo Handling," https://rakports.ae/services/container-cargo-handling/, accessed 16 Mar. 2020.

Finally, Qom, reputed as Iran's "pious city" that had a key role in the Iranian Revolution and is known for its religious traditionalism and purism, entered the path of an "Islamicised capitalism," neoliberal urbanism and middle-class consumerism, especially in the 2010s.[91] Modernisation, gentrification and prettification of the urban structures is taking place in accordance with the latest international standards, and the city is being rebranded in accordance with global tourist and consumer tastes. Shopping centres and leisure facilities are popping up across the city. Fashionable Palladian and White House-like villas represent a postmodern drag-and-drop routine of architecture of Western origin. The prosperity of the richer neighbourhoods contrasts with the disregard for poorer parts of the city; social inequalities and the spatial segregation of classes have considerably increased. In recent years, large parts of the clergy, traditionally associated with values of asceticism, have benefited from manifold material privileges and subsidies, while the local population widely suffers from price hikes and international sanctions.[92] Many of the mushrooming buildings in the better quarters of Qom belong to religious seminaries, which compete to be the most spectacular and luxurious. Consequently, social protests have time and again erupted here, too.

7. Conclusion: (Re-)Globalising Secondary Cities, Yet Variegated Trajectories

Despite considerable differences in specific trajectories, advancements and results, the secondary cities in the MENA region presented in this article show some important commonalities. Very often, they had stagnated in the past in the shadow of national primate cities and suffered from longstanding political and economic neglect and even overt oppression by the respective central authorities. This became particularly acute when the modern nation state was established and cities ended up at national peripheries, close to clearly demarcated (yet occasionally still shifting) and severely controlled territorial borders – which sometimes even closed due to tense relations or even war with immediate neighbour countries. Some of these places enjoyed reputations for being rebellious, which also contributed to their deliberate disregard by the state. Postcolonial nationalisation policies and civil wars did not make the situation better. Nevertheless, from a longer historical perspective, nearly all the presented cases experienced times when they exercised primary roles in national, imperial or regional urban systems: this included nodal economic positions, especially in trade and transport with far-reaching connections along important land and

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91. Cf. Kamaluddin Duaei, "Qom after Islamic Neoliberalism: A Narrative of the City in Limbo," *Middle East-Topics & Arguments* 12 (2019): 55-65. https://meta-journal.net/issue/view/230, accessed 19 July 2019.

92. Cf. also Mehdi Faraji, "Protesting Clerical Welfarism in Iran's Pious City," *Middle East Report Online*, 28 Jan 2019. https://merip.org/2019/01/protesting-clerical-welfarism-in-irans-pious-city, accessed 29 Jan. 2019.

sea routes, and sometimes respectable political and administrative functions. This often went hand in hand with a multi-ethnic population; and in the colonial era, certain cities enjoyed a large degree of autonomy, when they were under multinational administration separate from the rest of the country.

These secondary cities have been re-appreciated only in the course of economic opening and diversification strategies, combined with deconcentration policies and a concern for more regionally balanced national growth. Some local and regional authorities also have actively sought on their own to attain a position on the national, regional and global maps of economic flows and entanglements with targeted investment strategies, industrialisation policies and marketing campaigns. And last but not least, the cities under consideration have considerably transformed through the inclusion and engagement of transnational stakeholders acting for their own interests.

In nearly all these cities, transport infrastructure projects have a central role in enhancing transregional connections. Besides transnational road and rail schemes, in particular, huge world-class ports have been constructed and opened new opportunities. As fig. 19 demonstrates, the upper tier of the worldwide Top 100 ports is still strongly limited to world cities,[93] whereas a medium range of container terminals can be found connected to secondary cities. Accordingly, MENA port cities have re-emerged as eminent sea trade hubs. While, among the main examples, Salalah has focused on maritime and Edirne on terrestrial connections, Tangier plays on both registers. Salalah and Tangier perform pronounced functions in the global maritime trade network. At the same time, the establishment of important trade and transport infrastructure fits very well the regional orientations of the respective nation states in the context of multidirectional free trade and integration policies. We can also observe the intersection of trade flows and (whatever kind of) migration movements at emergent hub cities.

Hence, current development programmes encompass the opening of cities for integration into global flows of capital, goods and humans, but also the development of a "modern," "progressive" face. The neoliberally shaped urban transformation serves to increase attractiveness, under conditions of enhanced interurban competition, especially for a well-off national and international clientele of residents, workers, investors and tourists. This comprises the spread of shopping malls and gated communities and often gives the places a postmodern allure. Often, it also means copying globally and regionally circulating role models, from the copy-and-paste of Western architecture to endeavours to learn from the Dubai model: as such, Dubaisation is on the agenda in Tangier, Edirne

93. This conforms with insights by Sung-Woo Lee, Dong-Wook Song and César Ducruet, "A Tale of Asia's World Ports: The Spatial Evolution in Global Hub Port Cities," *Geoforum* 39, 1 (2008): 372-85, that strong spatial continuities persist in eastern parts of Asia between metropolitan areas of world cities and their global hub mega-port terminals.

and Salalah, whereas other secondary cities explicitly endeavour to become a sort of second Dubai. Cities such as Tangier and Edirne also fulfil important cultural functions related to festivalisation and heritagisation. Included in both translocal infrastructure and local urban development projects are endeavours to leverage geographical positions at maritime and terrestrial crossroads between world regions and as passage points between their own countries and the wider world. This also shows a strong commitment to strategically branding these locations to position themselves as attractive places for investment, residence and tourism. While Tangier wants to establish itself as a hub at the intersection between Europe and Africa and between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, Edirne has become a central transit point between Europe, the Middle East and Asia. Both are the "last stops," if not frontier towns, at the threshold of the European space of free circulation of commodities and persons. Salalah, in contrast, intends to hold a gateway position for the Gulf states to the maritime routes through the Indian Ocean without the need of passing through the sensitive Strait of Hormuz.[94] Cities' images have changed fundamentally, e.g. of Tangier, long reputed as a hotbed of vice and criminality.

A central finding is that many of these places have experienced considerable ups and downs not only in the past. Contemporary development paths are not straightforward, either, and still bear the risk of setback or failure. Much more than national centres and world cities, secondary cities are extremely vulnerable to external imponderabilities, such as global economic turbulences and geopolitical reversals. In particular, sectors like trade, transport and tourism, which are in the focus of current development and globalisation strategies, are very sensitive domains subject to political, economic and ecological disruptions. This relates to changing border situations, developments in the immediate regional neighbourhood, but also to incidents of global importance in the last two decades, such as the repercussions of 9/11,[95] the world financial crisis, the Arab Spring, the recent series of pandemics and natural disasters.

In centralised states, national decision-making continues to remain a major problem for such secondary centres, since it is carried out to the disadvantage of their needs and interests, limits subnational autonomy and interferes with local affairs and formally conceded competencies. While their "globalisation" has been in the focus, these secondary MENA cities show few features that render them specifically "Islamic" or "Oriental," aside from their geographical location and some architectural ornamentation. However, most of them experience specific forms of urban governance under repressive authoritarian regimes rather typical of Middle Eastern and North African states; and despite the uprisings

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94. Likewise, Port Said has strategically used its location at the northern entry to the Suez Canal.

95. For the effects of 9/11 on tourism in the Arab world, cp. Christian Steiner, *Tourismuskrisen und organisationales Lernen: Akteursstrategien in der Hotelwirtschaft der Arabischen Welt, Eine Pragmatische Geographie* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2009).

and overthrows of the Arab Spring, they did not in fact liberalise that much, but mostly experienced the restoration (or even deterioration) of existing regimes.[96]

At the same time, social problems have become evident; with segregating effects and widening socioeconomic gaps, spatial fragmentation has been exacerbated and marginalisation continues in most of the places described. Some urban fragments are globally much more interconnected than others and, concomitantly, show limited connections to their national hinterland. The neglect of historical quarters (if not restored for tourism and heritage purposes) and nearly ubiquitous rapid and extensive urban sprawl add to this. These secondary cities' hub functions also attract irregular flows. Many local projects benefit the local population only to a limited extent, as highly automated industries demand high technological skills and offer few job opportunities. As in other world and secondary cities across the MENA region, social discontent, protest and eruptions are among the consequences. The political functions of the cities under scrutiny are still rather limited today, but also rarely are they places for the head offices of important firms, which mostly remain located in national metropolises (e.g. Salalah-Muscat; Edirne-İstanbul). However, we should not forget that, despite the many sombre side effects, the cases demonstrated here are still the more successful secondary cities, while others continue to suffer from underdevelopment and being left behind, dependent and subordinated in the current processes of fractal globalisation.

In conclusion, many MENA cities have been outside the academic focus, as they are not considered to be among the top league of cities in the world. Nevertheless, these cities are not always any longer inward looking, shabby and left behind. Instead, since the 1990s, many of these "secondary cities" have experienced urban processes of "globalisation," first in the genuine understanding of increasing intensity, density and reach of translocal, transnational and transregional entanglements, but second, also by being affected by other globally (yet unevenly) deploying macro-processes such as neoliberalisation, postmodernisation and accompanying fragmentation – possibly at different speeds and intensities and following divergent trajectories. These cities perhaps do not determine the course of globalisation, but many do not accept being only passively affected; they want to proactively organise and shape their participation in it. At least, they endeavour to occupy crucial positions in specific networks and integrate specific circuits, perhaps not for all kinds of flows and not of global, but at least of transregional reach. Yet, the respective degrees, intensities and constellations of global or wider regional integration may differ considerably, and these cities are more easily prone to fall out of globalisation processes.

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96. Cf., among many others, Claudia Derichs and Thomas Demmelhuber, "Monarchies and Republics, State and Regime: Durability and Fragility in View of the Arab Spring," *Journal of Arabian Studies* 4, 2 (2014): 180-94.

In fact, these contemporary urban reconfigurations deploy on multiple scales. There are multiple entanglements between the immediate surroundings, the national level, macroregional contexts and the global arena, and sometimes intermediate scales are leaped over. So secondary cities, too, directly link with other cities and hubs in urban and port networks.[97] Global and regional events are immediately repercussive on local development. Agency has become more and more multi-scalar, encompassing interventions by local, national and transnational actors. With that, globalisation and neoliberalisation on the world and state level have been reproduced on the urban scale, as well.[98] This conforms with Neil Brenner's understanding of cities as places in continuous reterritorialisation and as interfaces between multiple, overlapping and shifting spatial scales.[99]

Hence, secondary cities, in the MENA region and beyond, form an important, yet relatively and inherently vaguely defined category of cities. Besides political attention, they deserve academic conceptual and empirical interest between a focus of research on the top global cities and existing, but very locally focused studies on small and medium cities. Instead, broader spatial and systemic perspectives are needed, as well as consideration of specific circumstances. The more such research gaps are filled, the more the eminent roles, but also the manifold and diverse functions, trajectories and challenges of secondary cities will come to the fore.

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97. For a broader urban perspective, cp. Saskia Sassen, "Globalization or Denationalization?," *Review of International Political Economy* 10, 1 (2003): 1-22.

98. On the multiple scales of globalisation and fragmentation, Scholz, *Geographische Entwicklungsforschung*, 221-58; cf. also Robinson, "Global and World Cities."

99. Cf., e.g., Neil Brenner, "Globalisierung und Reterritorialisierung: Städte, Staaten und die Politik der räumlichen Redimensionierung im heutigen Europa," *WeltTrends* 17 (1997): 7-30, who still primarily concentrated on global metropolises.

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العنوان: عولمة "المدن الثانوية" في الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا: دراسة حالات وقضايا مفاهيمية

ملخص: بما أن البحث الحضري المعاصر يركز على "المدن العالمية" ومن ضمنها بلدان الجنوب، فإن هذه المقالة تسعى إلى إظهار التطورات التي تشهدها "المدن الثانوية" بفعل العولمة المتسارعة، والليبرالية الجديدة للسياسات الحضرية، وتطورات "ما بعد الحداثة." ويحاول صناع القرار موضعة هذه المدن في مواقع مفصلية داخل شبكات تدفق السلع والأشخاص والصور. والأكيد أن هذه المدن ليست حاضرة لا في قمرة قيادة العولمة ولا في الدوائر العالمية الرئيسية. وفي الوقت الذي تشعر فيه بعض المدن بأنها "معرضة" ببساطة للعولمة، فإن أخرى تضطر للاندماج في الشرايين العبروطنية والعبرجهوية بغية تحقيق النمو السوسيواقتصادي والحضري. وإذا كانت المدن المينائية أو الحدودية تستفيد على الخصوص من مواقعها الإستراتيجية، فإن ذلك لا ينعكس بالضرورة على غالبية السكان، مما يفضي إلى مزيد من التفتت السوسيومجالي. وانطلاقا من هذا

التشخيص، تحاول المقالة بلورة بعض الأدوات المفاهيمية التي تثبت الدور المهم لهذه المدن من الدرجة الثانية، في الأنسجة الوطنية والجهوية والدولية. وإلى جانب بعض الحالات الأخرى، تمثل طنجة (المغرب)، وصلالة (عمان) وأدرنة (تركيا) أمثلة بارزة في منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا، لمدن بزغت من جديد تتقاطع في بعض السمات وتتباين في مساراتها.

الكلمات المفتاحية: النمو الحضري، المدن الثانوية، العولمة، الليبرالية الجديدة، ما بعد الحداثة، التفتت، البنية التحتية.

Titre: La mondialisation des "villes secondaires" au Moyen Orient et en Afrique du Nord: Etudes de cas et considérations conceptuelles.

Résumé: Les "villes mondiales," celles dans les pays des Suds incluses, sont dans le focus de la recherche urbaine contemporaine. L'article veut démontrer que des "villes secondaires" (*secondary cities*) montrent des évolutions similaires liées à la "mondialisation" rapide, à la "néolibéralisation" progressive des politiques urbaines et au développement de caractéristiques "postmodernes." Les décideurs urbains tentent de placer ces villes sur des positions charnières dans les réseaux et les flux de biens, des hommes et des images. Certes, ces villes ne sont pas aux commandes de la mondialisation ni présentes dans tous les circuits importants à l'échelle mondiale. Mais, tandis que certaines villes se sentent simplement "exposées" à la mondialisation, d'autres s'efforcent activement de s'insérer dans des circuits transnationaux et transrégionaux, souvent très spécifiques afin de favoriser leur développement socioéconomique et urbain. En particulier, des villes portuaires ou frontalières profitent de leur positionnement stratégique. Cependant cela ne bénéficie pas nécessairement à la majorité de la population et pousse encore plus la fragmentation sociospatiale. C'est en partant de constat que l'article élabore quelques éléments conceptuels qui montrent le rôle important de ces villes de second rang dans les tissus nationaux, régionaux et mondiaux. A côté de quelques cas d'étude trouvés dans la littérature scientifique, il présente Tanger (Maroc), Salalah (Oman) et Edirne (Turquie) comme exemples éminents dans la région MENA qui démontrent une (ré)émergence récente et quelques traits communs, mais aussi des trajectoires divergentes.

Mots-clés: Développement urbain, villes secondaires, mondialisation, néolibéralisation, postmodernisation, fragmentation, infrastructure.