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MOROCCO AND BRITAIN DURING THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION

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From the Glorious Revolution, British foreign policy sought to limit the expansion of French power. The result was the Nine Years War (1688-97) followed by the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1713) – both of which became part of the "second Hundred Years War with France" that came to an end with Waterloo. However, a "little more than two decades following the Revolution of 1688", Britain emerged as "a great military power." This transformation "remains one of the most remarkable, if still insufficiently appreciated" phenomena of the early modern period.(1) According to James A. Williamson, the Mediterranean theater was "a powerful if silent factor in winning" for Britain her ascendancy over France. So today, I propose to discuss one of the Mediterranean factors that contributed to Britain's rise to power: the role of Morocco in Britain's Mediterranean encounter. In specific, I will look at the years of the War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-1713 and the support that Mulay Ismail extended to Britain.

The Western Mediterranean of the Kingdom of Morocco and of the regencies of Lybia, Tunisia, and Algeria was contested because those countries provided naval bases, natural resources, and diplomatic alliances for the rival European superpowers. Morocco and the regencies knew their own strategic importance, especially in terms of the destabilization that their privateers (along with French privateers and pirates with whom they cooperated) could cause to European commercial fleets.(2) Furthermore, during times of shortage and famine in France, Britain, and other parts of Europe, North African grain and other supplies were crucial for the fighting forces on the continental theater - especially that the price of grain in the European west was "mostly higher than in the territories of the [Ottoman] Empire" and Morocco(3). After Britain

(1) D.W. Jones, "Defending the Revoltion. The Economics, Logistics, and Finance of England's War Effort, 1688-1712," in *The World of William and Mary: Anglo-Dutch Prespecttives on the Revolution of 1688-89*, eds. Dale Hoak and Mordechai Feingold, Stanford, 1996, p. 59 in pp. 59-74.

(2) "In 1693 it was claimed that 1,500 ships worth L3 m had already been lost. From 1688 to 1697 ships from St Malo, a major privateering port, were responsible for 1,275 prizes and ransoms", Julian Hoppit, *A land of Liberty? England 1689-1727,* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2000, p. 100. See also D. W. Jones, "England's War Effort, 1688-1712," in *The World of William and Mary*, ed. Dale Hoak and Mordechai Feingold, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1996, p. 71.

(3) Mehmet Bulut, *Ottoman-Dutch economic relations in the early modern period, 1571-1699,* Hilversum, Verloren, 2001, p. 131.

came into possession of Gibraltar (1704), Majorca (1706), the North African regions became the suppliers of these outposts. Without support from North Africa, Britain could not have held on to its new Mediterranean colonies and its spreading hegemony. As Joseph Morgan, member of the British consulate in Algiers confirmed in 1731/32:

> *Our Armies, and those of our Allies in Spain must infallibly have perished, had they not been supported from Barbary; Our Gibraltar and Port-Mahon (long may they remain ours) had constantly a great Provision of their daily Subsistence from this very Market [Morooco]*.(4)

The five years between the end of the Nine Years War and the beginning of the War of the Spanish succession proved difficult after the harvest failed again in Scotland, and after the Great British Famine of 1697-99 pushed grain and wheat prices up causing death by starvation of one third of the Scottish population.(5) Such traumas further reminded British (and French) commanders and traders based in North Africa that in the event of another war -- and the matter of Spain's succession was inevitably leading to such a war - Britain would need to have reliable ports for refitting its flee, protecting commercial shipping, and buying food supplies. In October 1698, the French consul emphasized the importance of Algiers in regard to ensuring wheat supplies for his country and warned of the approach of the British fleet under Admiral Aylmer;(6) by January 1699, he was commending the loyalty of the Algerians in supplying biscuit, water, and sheep for "envers de deux mille bâtiment français."(7) A few months later, in April 1699, the British fleet reached Algiers and admiral Aylmer offered rich presents to the dey, whereupon the British factor was given additional permission to go "into the Countrey … to find Horses for his Purpose".(8)

Meanwhile, back in Meknes, Mulay Ismail was re-evaluating his relations with the two European superpowers and thinking of ways to co-

(4) J. Morgan, *A Compleat History of the Present Seat of War in Africa,* 1732, p. 135.
(5) Holmes, *The Making of a Great Power: Late Stuart Georgian Britain*, 1660-1722, London, New York, Longman, 1993, p. 200.
(6) Mohammed Touili, *Correspondance des Consuls de France à Alger 1642-1792*, 18 October 1689, p. 89; 23 October 1698, p. 90.
(7) *Ibid*.,12 January 1699, p. 91.
(8) SP (State Papers) 71/4/11, 13 April 1699, Se *C.S.P.D., William III 1 January, 1699-31 March, 1700*, "Mr. Marshall, who bought horses for his Majesty in Barbary," p. 348. Horses were not only needed for a battle, but as breeding studs, too. See also Touili, *Ibid.,* 15 March 1699, p. 91 about a «connoisseur» who was commissioned to buy horses for the king of England.

opt an ally. In February 1698, he sent a letter to the exiled king, James II, in France, urging him to leave Catholic France, sneak into Portugal and from there return to his country where he would be welcomed by his people – but only if he renounced his Cathilicism. Ismail continued by informing James that had he not been "an Arab," belonging to "a people who knew nothing of the sea, or had he someone who did know about the sea," he would have sent him a fleet to help him in invading Britain reassuming his crown(9). Ismail was eager to affirm the divine right of kings – but only Protestant kings. A year later, he sent his ambassador, Abdallah ibn Aisha, to Paris to negotiate an alliance with Louis XIV. Ibn Aisha addressed the French monarch as the Emperor of Europe and his own ruler as the Emperor of Africa and compared the two favorably with each other. During the visit, ibn Aisha met with James II, and reported back to Mulay Ismail about James' desire to cooperate with the Moroccan ruler in a military compaign against William III. Evidently, the letter which Mulay Ismail had sent him had gone down well with a man who was desperate for help. With the generous welcome shown to his ambassador, and with the hope of an alliance with James, Ismail became so excited that he proposed marriage to one of the Fren king's natural daughters. As far as he was concerned, he was pivotal in the Eurio-Islamic Mediterranean – the theater of Anglo-French rivalry. That is why he tried to do what all monarchs did: to seal a military alliance with marriage(10).

The French monarch turned down the marriage proposal – unless Mulay Ismail was willing to convert to Christianity along with all his population. So the Moroccan ruler made a strategic decision – to turn to Britain and to King William III. The decision was risky: France was nearer to the Moroccan shores than Britain, and French privateers were notoriously active out of their bases in Toulon and Algiers, and they could pose serious danger to Moroccan shipping. But Ismail stuck to his decision and in July 1701, he authorized the governor of Tetouan to offer "to the English Nation .. from our Ports, all they needed either of water, Wood, or ankering."(11) Such an offer could not but have been more propitious: a few months later, 7 September 1701, Britain joined the Grand Alliance of Austria and the Dutch Republic against France. In May of the following year, Queens Anne declared war and the British fleet entered the Mediterranean to ensure safe passage of the Levant Company ships. There was need to ensure that no other failure like that at Beaching

(9) For the text and study of the letter, see Comte Henry de Castries, *Moulay Ismail et Jacques II* Paris, Ernest Leroux, 1903.

(10) For a full account of this affair, see Eugène Plantet, *Moulay Ismaël Empreur du Maroc et La Princesse de Conti,* Paris, 1912.

(11) SP 71/15/33v, 22 July 1701.

Head in 1690 or the devastating destruction of the Smyrna fleet at Lagos in 1693 would recur – when over a hundred British ships had been plundered by the French.

At this juncture, the Moroccan shores became crucial for ensuring safe navigation for British ships. Mulay Ismail ordered al-Caid Ali ibn Abdallah to write to the British Admiral of the Fleet in the Mediterranean, Sir George Rooke, and inform him that his "Master esteems more the English than any other Nation of Europe." His master knew how much the fleet needed supplies and Caid Ali assured the admiral that "on the Coast between Tangier & Ceuta, there is abundence both of Water & Wood which your Officers may send with all Security."[12] The fleet was big and needed more supplies than those that could be found in Tangier, which is why the reference was to Ceuta. But Ceuta was then, and remains, under Spanish control, and Ismail hoped to kill two birds with one stone. He would help the British at the same time that he would gain their support in liberating Ceuta. In "Some Considerations sent to Sir George Rooke," an anonymous (English) author wrote that the Caid had told him that Ismail "would assist the English to take Ceuta, and that if we would keep it we should without any Mollestation. Moreover he would give us as much Land as to the Second Point of Land with the Streights beyond Ceuta, Enough for ten thousand head of Cattle to Manure and Manage as we shall think fit."[13]

A year later, in September 1703, Mulay Ismail repeated his offer to the British for a port outside Tangier for their ships to dock and store material. As a memorandum from Jezreel Jones, the factor in Morocco, stated, the English could have "a Place at Tanger without the Wall For a Magazin for Stores for Her Majesties ships."[14] Twenty years after having fought the British out of Tangier, Ismail was inviting them back – on his own terms, and also in support of British naval strategy in the Mediterranean. A treaty was negotiated to prevent seizure of captives and ships by either side, at the same time that it permitted British ships to buy whatever provisions and "Refreshmts … in such quanititys or qualitys as they shall have occasion for, at ye Market Prices."[15] To ensure his commitment, Ismail was to receive the following presents:

> *A Marine Barrometer; A large Double Microscope with an Arabic Inscription on the Pillar of Brass (signifying God hath created*

(12) SP 71/15/9, no date.
(13) SP 71/15/64, no date.
(14) SP 71/15/67r, 15 November 1703.
(15) SP 71/15/43r, (c. 1703).

> *strange and wonderfull things for Our Instruction, And his Power is in all Generations) ... A Fine Repeating Clock with Numericall Arabic letters and figures on the dyall plate, and God is only True in Arabic on the top Plate at the houre of twelve set to Arabic Tunes.*

There were also six guns over five feet long with Qura'nic inscriptions in Arabic.(16) Eager to appeal to the Arabo-Islamic sensibility of the North African ruler, Britons were crafting gifts specifically designed to fit in the religious culture of their allies. Very likely, factors resident in Meknes and other parts of Morocco, communicated to manufacturers in England the style and calligraphy that was to be used on the gifts; and either they, if they had become proficient in Arabic, or the Laudian professor of Arabic at Oxford (Thomas Hyde, d. 1703, John Wallis, 2nd and 3rd professors), would have selected the appropriate Qura'nic verses that were subsequently inscribed on the presents. On the dial, "Alla –u- Haq"/God is truth was carved. What the "Arabic Tunes" were, how they were remembered and reproduced, is unfortunately impossible to ascertain. But the British were applying themselves to understand and deal with Moroccans on culturally and religiously safe grounds. The Moroccans and their ports and resources were crucial for the war.

The need to send other presents became crucial after the British fleet seized Gibraltar from Spain in July 1704. The capture was quite a feat: Admiral Rooke, wrote Gilbert Burnet in his *History*,

> *fell in upon Gibraltar, where some bold men ventured to go ashore in a place where it was not thought possible to climbe up the rocks, yet they succeeded in it. When they got up, they saw all the women of the town were come out to a chapel there, to implore the Virgin's protection. They seized on them, and that contributed not a little to dispose those in the town to surrender.*(17)

But Gibraltar was a small rock with no natural resources that could provision the fleet; and at times of war, trade in a free port was precarious. That is why all eyes now turned across the strait to Morocco, rich in supplies. While it was strategically important for the British forces to hold onto the rock, it would be quite difficult to maintain their hold if they could not ensure supplies. From Lisbon, Jezreel Jones soon after wrote how short on provions Gibraltar already was, and how much the army was also in need of horses. But there were two difficulties: first, and because of French and

(16) SP 71/15/88 ff., 13 March 1704.

(17) *History of his own Time*, abridged Thomas Stackhouse, introd. David Allen, London and New York, 1979, p. 400.

Spanish bribers, British agents trying to acquire horses were failing.[18] On 30 July 1704, Jones confirmed how the French consuls and their "fryers" had wormed their way into Moroccan favor: in order to offset their influence, Jones suggested offering presents to the "sultana, Her Son & the Secretarys."[19] The sultana, after all, was the famous Balqis, of English stock, who had risen to a position of preeminence in the court and harem of Mulay Ismail. The second difficulty, which Jones soon discovered, was in transporting the horses[20]. To do so, there was need for extensive local help. In December 1704, Consul John Methuen sent Jezreel Jones to win over Ismail's help in facilitating the transfer of "horses corn & all other necessarys for Gibraltar" (including "quantity of Straw and Barley necessary for their Maintenance").[21]

Earlier, and on 13 August, the Duke of Marlborough had scored a decisive victory at Blenheim; it was followed on 24 August by another victory in the naval battle of Malaga, forcing the French Mediterranean fleet to withdraw to Toulon. As soon as it became clear to Mulay Ismail that the British were on a winning streak, he assured Consul Methuen again that he was very "inclined to have a good correspondence with her Majesty,"[22] and he repeated through Jones his offer to assist the queen against her enemies and to become part of what he would have seen as an anti-French coalition led by Britain. Like his predecessors since the beginning of the seventeenth century, he invoked the memory of Queen Elizabeth and her cooperation with Moroccan rulers. His ambassador told Queen Anne how much his master "desired to have the same correspondence & amity with her Majesty that Muley Hamet Dhehby had with Queen Elizabeth."[23] By September, an agreement had been reached over horses, and the Duke of Schombergh brought "a great many" of the suitable breed. Evidently, horses from the north of the country fared much better on European soil than horses from the Middle Atlas region.

But there was still need for more horses and other resources, as consul Methuen explained:

> *Horses to mount some of the Queen's subjects, and about a quantity of wheat and barley, for the maintenance of Her Majties Forces in these parts and of the said horses. The Number of horses proposed by the said Prince [Hesse Darmstad] is three thousand, besides which if the Emperour can spare so many; Her Britanick*

(18) SP 89/22/22 r-v.
(19) SP 89/88/12v, 30 July 1704, letter from Jezreel Jones in Lisbon.
(20) SP 89/18/146r, 16 September 1704.
(21) SP 89/18/202v, 19 December 1704; SP 71/15/124v.
(22) SP 89/18/142r, 18 August 1704.
(23) SP 71/15/101r. no date 1704.

> *Majtys Cavalry in Portugal will want two thousand more in order to remount them, and I am ready to adjust with your Exly the manner in which the whole number of five thousand Horses or the three thousand proposed by the Prince of Hess Darmstadt shall be chosen and delivered, and the price and manner of the paying for them.*(24)

Although Mulay Ismail was more inclined to "the English", wrote Jones to Secretary of State (Sir Charles) Hedges, than to any other European nation(25), the French and the Spanish continued to do everything they could to prevent him from supplying the English "with anything"(26). So, and again to assist Ismail against French pressure, English and Dutch military technicians were sent to Morocco to help build Ismail's army in preparation for joint Anglo-Moroccan campaign.(27) Jones assured the Secretary Hedges that the Moroccan ruler was very favorable to Britain: if her "majesty desired ten thousand of his best horses and their riders he would send them against Her Ennemys."(28) Acquiring horses, the famous Barbary horses, had always been a European, and an English, desire, but Moroccan rulers, as early as Mulay Ahmad al-Mansur had viewed them as military assets and, on religious grounds, had refused to sell them unless to trustworthy allies - as in 1581 to Queen Elizabeth.(29) Whether Mulay Ismail could spare 10,000 horses is unclear, but at least the will was there to support Queen Anne, and perhaps get his troops on European/Spanish territory- a dream that he shared with all Moroccan rulers who had envisioned the reconquest of al-Andalus.

It took until March 1705 for Britain to fully control Gibraltar, after which Queen Anne decided to turn it into a free port - in some respects hoping it becomes what Charles II had wanted Tangier to be. Meanwhile, half the ships of the royal fleet were committed to the Mediterranean.(30) Mulay Ismail hoped for naval support for his siege of Ceuta - a curious reversal of the 1620s when the English had sought out the Moriscos in Tetuan to help them seize Ceuta.(31) Moroccan forces had begun operations against the Spanish outpost in 1694, and had maintained the pressure intermittently for over a decade.

(24) SP 71/15/115, 25 May 1705.
(25) SP 71/15/128r.
(26) SP 71/15/132r, 27 June 1705.
(27) *Gazette de France*, 1705, 138.
(28) SP 71/15/128r, 27 June 1705, letter Jezreel Jones to Sir Charles Hedges.
(29) J. Caillé, "Le commerce anglais avec le Maroc pendant la seconde moitié du XVI siècle," *Revue Africaine* 84 (1940), pp. 217-218 in pp. 186-219.
(30) D. W. Jones, "Sequel to Revolution: The economics of England's emergence as a Great Power, 1688-1712" in *The Anglo-Dutch Moment*, ed. Jonathan Israel, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 392.
(31) Muhammad Hajji, *A-Zawiyah al-Dilla'iyah,* Rabat, 1964, p. 181.

In 1702, Isma'il had promised to sell the British "any number of Horse & Provisions for the Subsistance of the armies on reasonable rates."(32) After all, the Spanish were the "Common Enemy" of Britain and Morocco, confirmed the English consul, and any war against Spain conduced to Moroccan security.(33) Now, in 1705 and as a new campaign was being launched, Ismail turned to the English fleet, indicated threateningly via Jerzeel Jones, that if he did not receive naval assistance the English should not count on corn supplies till after all the 10,000 men laying siege to Ceuta had been fed: if the British could help end the stalemate, corn would be supplied.(34) He also authorized Aclaid 'Ali ibn 'Abdellah to repeat to Admiral Rooke the promise that if the British helped the Moroccans drive the Spaniards away, they could retain control of the outpost, "without any Mollestation." Indeed, they could then defortify Ceuta and use the land westward "for ten thousand head of Cattle, to Manure and Manage as we shall think fitt."(35) The region could become the provisioning zone for the fleet as well as for the bases that the British now possessed after the capture of Alicante, Cartagena, Ibiza and Majorca between June-September. Mulay Ismail repeated his offer, telling the "English" to keep Ceuta if they got rid of the occupiers: anything to get rid of the Spaniards and replace them with an "English good Neighbour."(36)

Having occupied Mediterranean outposts that were surrounded by the enemy and that could not be reached and provisioned except by sea, Britons became completely dependent on their North African neighbors for assistance. "[W]ood is wanting so much at Gibraltar," wrote Consul Metheun from Lisbon on 19 February 1706, "that if wee cannot gett it from Morocco wee shall not be able to bake bread & ye souldiers will every day pull down ye houses to get timber to burn.(37) Later that year, one Graven Nash procured from Gibraltar a large amount of gunlocks for Morocco: unless we give them the locks, he explained, the garrison of Gibraltar "must expect no more refreshments from this country."(38) Gibraltar and other bastions had nowhere to turn but the Maghrib.

In May 1706, a battle had been fought around Ceuta in which dozens of Moroccans and Spaniards were killed. Ismail knew that unless he had British help, he would not be able to conquer the outpost: his siege would not be effective as long as the Spaniards were able to receive fresh supplies by

(32) SP 71/15/36, 4 October 1702.
(33) SP 71/15/49, 1702.
(34) SP 89/88/23r, 27 June-8 July 1705, letter from Jezreel Jones to Sir Charles Hedges.
(35) SP 71/15/117, 1 June 1705.
(36) SP 71/15/211, 1706.
(37) SP 89/19/15r, 19 February1706.
(38) SP 71/15/197, 30 September 1706.

sea from the homeland. If the British fleet cut off those supplies, the bastion would not survive. But the British were not willing to take such a step. So Ismail repeated through his ambassador to England, Ahmed Cardenas, his hope and "desire that through the Gate of Love & Friendship which is open to us both, we may be assisted in reduceing it be sea."(39) He also reminded the queen that he was the supplier of Gibraltar, and that while he was happy that the rock was in British hands, he would hope that the British would allow the Moroccans to "resort as friends and supply them with what they may have occasion for."(40) Fortunately, in that same month, May, Malborough won another victory at Ramillies. Soon after, in June, the Morocco ambassador in London requested audience with the queen to convey to her master's "rejoicing" for her "success in all parts against her Enemies."(41) At the same time that he reiterated the request regarding Ceuta.(42) So excited was the ambassador that he was not unwilling to seek an audience with the queen inside even inside St Paul's Cathedral.(43)

Alcaid Ali bin Abdellah too congratulated Consul Methuen on the British "… victorys obtained agst the French. God grant a succession of the like."(44) But Queen Anne was unwilling to help Ismail's forces against Ceuta. In anger, the Moroccan king wrote a letter, addressed not to the queen, but "those who command the English fleet and all at court from among the English who have a say, adding or subtracting, resolving and deciding."(45) Ismail clearly knew the dynamics of government in London and recognized that decision-making regarding foreign affairs did not lie solely in the person of the queen. The letter was sent sometime before 22 September 1706 and raised incisive points about Anglo-Moroccan relations, and more generally, North African-European relations. Was religion, Mulay Ismail asked, the determining factor in international relations, or was it mutual self-interest? Ismail explained that his desire to repossess Ceuta did not arise out of his desire to control the entrance to the Straits of Gibraltar, "for we are not [a people] of sail and ship." Ceuta was on Muslim soil and Muslims were more worthy of it than Spaniards:

(39) SP 71/15/169v, 29 May 1706.

(40) SP 71/15/169v, 29 May 1706.

(41) SP 71/15/179, 26 June 1706. See 182 for a translation of the address made to the queen. Similarly in a letter by Alcaid Aly ben Abdalah to Consul Methuen on 3 November 1706, BL ADD 61536, fol. 37.

(42) SP 71/15/179 and 180 (same letter) and 182: 26 June and 4 July 1706.

(43) SP 71/15/179r, 26 June 1706. For a detailed study of the visit of Moroccan ambassador to London and the rivalry between pro-French and pro-English factions in Morocco, see J. A. O. C. Brown, "Anglo-Moroccan Relations and the Embassy of Ahmad Qardanash, 1706-1708," *The Historical Journal*, 51, 3 (2008): 599-620.

(44) 3 November 1706: BL ADD 61536 p. 37.

(45) The letter is reproduced in Muhammad ibn al-Qasim al-Ansari al-Sabit, *Ikhtisar al-Akhbar*, ed. Abd al-Wahab Ben Mansur, Rabat, 1983, 2nd ed., pp. 81-86.

it was not strategically important for Moroccans, he emphasized, because the "Muslims" were no longer in possession of al-Andalus to which Ceuta used to serve as a part of contact. So why, Ismail asked, were the English unwilling to help the Moroccans against the Spaniards? After all, the Spaniards were not the same as the English, and the religious difference between the Protestant English and the Muslim Moroccans was not unlike the differences between the Protestant English and the Catholic Spaniards. So why, he asked testily, did the English prefer that Ceuta be under the "Emperor"/Philip V rather than under the Moroccans with whom there was a truce, and with whom there was naval and land cooperation? "Helping and supporting the Muslims evacuate Ceuta [of Spaniards] is better and more important and more useful to you [the English] than allowing the Spaniards [to keep outpost] who are in obedience to the Emperor." He then explained that the damage done to the Moroccans by the Spanish occupation of Ceuta was minimal since the Moroccans, not being a people of the sea, were not exposed to Spanish piratical attacks; but the damage done to English shipping was major, especially since English ships crossed the strait numerous times in the year and fell prey to Ceuta-based pirates.

The letter did not have the desired effect. The British remained unwilling to extend help, and actually started looking at Algiers for assistance. In specific, Oran loomed as an ideal outpost, and sometime in 1707, a plan was put in place so that Oran would be seized: the fleet was to block up "Oran by Sea and to desire His Highness Concurrance [Algerian Dey] in cutting off the Communication by Land, to drive away all Cattle remove all sorts of Provisions a proper distance from the Fortification of Oran and Marsa al-Kebir." This strategy was now feasible because in August, the French squadron in Toulon had been scuttled- 46 ships in all.(46) The Mediterranean was now Britain's and once Oran was taken, the British would obtain Marsa el Kebir from the Dey "for His Majesty's Service."(47) By August 1708, the British had captured Sardinia and in September Minorca with its important naval base in Mahon Oran was to furnish "abundant supply of Provisions for the Garrisons of Minorce, Gibraltar, and that part of the Navy Employed in the Mediterranean."

(46) Wikipedia: "The campaign's only fruit was that, in order to prevent their ships falling into the enemy's hands, the French had sunk their whole squadron of more than forty six ships of between fifty and 110 guns in the harbour. King Louis XIV gave orders that they be sunk and later be refloated. He was concerned that the Royal Navy would burn the ships; the three deckers would lie with only their upper decks showing showing above the water. Much of the damage sustained, however, proved irreparable; it is estimated that the French Navy lost 15 ships of the line in this operation, thereby putting it quite out of its power to contest the English control of the Mediterranean."

(47) SP 71/15/218-219.

Mulay Isma'il still hoped to win over the queen. Not giving up on possible cooperation, he sent her two emissaries, "Elhage Gusman & Rice [rayyes] Elwood" who assured her that he had "refused very great Offers lately made by the French King" because he "would not Correspond but wth your Majt."(48) Oddly, and despite the "dismal Prospect of a Famine" in France and the rest of the region toward the end of 1709,(49) the queen showed no interest in them and did not grant them audience. In April 1710, Hajj Guzman testily wrote to the Duke of Sunderland asking him for a "quick dispatch": "I came neither to buy nor sell, but to fulfill my Masters will, and as I have been above Eight months on his Message to Deliver the Letters and returne with answers."(50) By July nothing had happened, and so he and his companions petitioned again, explaining how they had been away from their country six months in Gibraltar, two months at sea, and three months in London, and asked for "Releife" in order for them to return "to theire owne Country."(51)

Meanwhile, there was another, curious ambassador in London- an Armenian who was also sent by Mulay Ismail to the Queen. On 10 January 1710, and as Bentura de Razi was sailing to England, he received a letter from the British ambassador in Lisbon, Thomas Martin, asking for his help. The

> *Scarcity of bread encreases every day. If your Senoria can compleat matters, so that the ship designed with Provisions from Sally to this place may come at a time when we have so great an occasion [that would be desirable, as too if you would] induce [the Emperor] of Morocco to grant leave for the Exportation of Wheat& Barly for the use of Her Britanic Majestes Troops in Portugal*.(52)

Soon after arriving in London, Bentura had his audience with the queen. The letter he presented to her may have been intended to emphasize religious commonality since it opened with an inclusive invocation: "In the name of God Gracious and Merciful (Full of Mercy & Forgiveness) And there is noe Power nor Anxiety but by the Permission and Ordinance of He who is the High and Mighty God."(53) Again, nothing transpired of that ambassadorial intervention, but the defeat and surrender of the British forces in Spain

(48) BL ADD 61542, fol. 186. The letter mentions that the French king was willing to send "Philip of Anjou as a Hostage for the persormance of those offers".

(49) Post Man, December 24-7 (1709) in William Bragg Ewald, Rogues*, Royalty and Reporters: The Age of Queen Anne through its Newspapers,* Westport, Connecticut, 1978, p. 61.

(50) BL 61542, fol. 180.

(51) SP 71/15/229.

(52) BL MS 61542, 178.

(53) BL 61493, 51v.

at Brihuega in December 1710 made conditions in Gibraltar even more precarious than they already were. By June 1711, Gibraltar was supplied completely from Barbary.(54)

Two years later, in March 1713, peace treaties between Britain and France were signed in Utrecht, ending the War of the Spanish Succession. The treaties celebrated Britain's victory over France at the same time that they ensured London of succeeding Amsterdam as the "centre of world trade".(55) In London, Mulay Isma'il's Armenian ambassador, Bentura de Zary, hastened to gain permission to congratulate the queen at St Paul's Cathedral- and to request a "Stricter Alliance than formerly."(56)

Mulay Ismail had been vindicated in his support of Britain and in helping sustain her Mediterranean fleet and outposts. Such support was widely recognized in North Africa, as Joseph Morgan reported over twenty years after the end of the war. The war would not have ended favorably, nor would Britain have been able to support its naval and military presence in the Mediterranean without the direct intervention of Mulay Mulay Isma'il and the natural resources that his country offered. In 1714, Ismail welcomed the accession of King George I to the throne, and hoped that relations between Britain and Morocco would continue to prosper, and perhaps improve. Such friendship was reflected in the openness with which the two countries treated visitors and emissaries. In 1721, a London delegation to ransom British captives in Salé was given the opportunity to visit the inside of the royal compound in Meknes, producing, perhaps, the first authentic eye-witness account of some of Mulay Ismail's extended family:

> *The first place we were carried into was that part inhabited by the Principall Queen, called the Queen of Sheriffs. We had a short sight of her, as she was looking out of a small window to see us pass by. She seemed to be a Comely handsome Woman, of a tawny Complexion, but neverthelesse said to be the fairest of all the Queens… We had a sight of the Queen [another] of the place at her window, who is a Mulatto. We saw likewise severall of the king's Women upon the tops of the Square who came there out of curiosity to look at us*.(57)

A year later, Mulay Ismail wrote a letter to King George opening it with a slew of honorific titles about the dominion and influence of George I over

(54) SP 71/15/323 (9 June 1711).
(55) Christopher Hill, *The Century of Revolution, 1603-1714*, London, Cardinal Books, 1974, p. 230.
(56) SP 71/16/75, 2 August 1713.
(57) BL, MS 47995, Leake Papers, 29 r-v.

England, Britain, Ireland, France, and Holland. He emphasized the mahabba/love and the mawadda/friendship between them, based on the "treaty and truce that have always between you and the kings of Morocco." Given the commercial and diplomatic cooperation that had been ongoing between the two kings, Mulay Isma'il asked George to intervene on behalf of Moroccan merchants who had been taken captive by the Spaniards, notwithstanding the English flag on the ship. Since Britain was at peace with Spain, Mulay Ismail reminded King George that the treaty between Britain and Morocco stipulated that "a ship from us or from you, once it sails into port in our country or yours, it and all in it, whoever they may be, are safe and are not to be molested." He concluded by reprimanding the British king: "It is not acceptable that kings forget or ignore huqūq al-nass/the legal rights of people when people complain."(58) King George intervened, and the ship and its Moroccan captives were released, which confirmed the positive image of Britons in Morocco.

The British navy gave Great Britain commercial and naval control of the Mediterranean (and the Atlantic). In so doing, it gave "Birth [to] a Great Power."(59) In part, what sustained the navy and outposts in the Mediterranean were the supplies that were furnished by Morocco, as well as the strategic ports facing the French mainland.

So what impact did this cooperation have on English imagination?

Oddly, very little. In a decade of danger, victory, defeat, and desperateness (1702-1713), there was no significant imagining of the Islamic Mediterranean in English thought. This is in sharp contrast with the Elizabethan and early Stuart periods and with the two decades of British colonization of Tangier when there were plays, pamphlets, and ballads about the Moors. The Elizabethan period witnessed the emergence of the Moor as an important dramatic figure- as hero, villain, captor and convert- with all the ambivalence that Shakespeare could endow Othello. The period in which controlled Tangier, 1661-84 and thought of themselves as inaugurating their thousand-year empire in Africa: that period witnessed plays by John Dryden and Aphra Behn and Elkanah Settle, along with pamphlets about the attractiveness of building a little England in Tangier. But during the most dangerous war which Britain faced against France in the Mediterranean (until Napoleon) and the triangulation of relations with Morocco (and the other Regencies), there was little. There were a few Turks (not Moors) on stage: Nicholas Rowe's 1702 reworking of

(58) SP 102/1.

(59) I borrow these words from Geoffrey Holmes' title of chapter 14 in *The Making of a Great Power: Late Stuart and early Georgian Britain, 1660-1722*, London, 1993.

Tamburlaine;(60) the 1704 play, Abra-Mule by Joseph Trapp with, yet again, Mohamet the IVth, Empror of the Turks; and Mrs. Manley's *The Royal Mischief*, with the plot taken from John Chardin's description of Persia. As for the Moors, there was the sympathetic description of the explusion of the Moriscos from Spain just about a century earlier by Michael Geddes in 1702, but then, two years later, there was the landmark account about captivity and forcible conversion to Islam in Algiers, published by Joseph Pitts. Although Simon Ockley was attracted to the philosophical Sufism of Andalusian Ibn Tufayl in 1707, and published his own translation of Hayy ibn Yaqdhan, a few years later, 1713, he published yet another captivity account describing the "Nature and Manner of Living of the Inhabitants, their kind of Government, Laws, Customs, Traffic, Religion, and other Rites and Ceremonies" in North Africa, ending the account with the "the extream Misery of Christian Captives in Barbary."(61) So no significant imagining.

Although the Islamic Mediterranean during the War of the Spanish Succession was partly responsible for Britain's rise to supremacy, it did not inspire imaginative creativity. Is it that times of dangerous and protracted war, horses are more important than poetry, ports and grain more reassuring than the braggadocio of the stage?

(60) Nicholas Rowe praised the Anglo-Dutch king and denigrate his French adversary by writing a play about Tamburlaine, in which the Scythian was represented by Wiliam III, and the defeated and villinous Turkish sultan, Bajazet,

By King Louis XIV. Literature had not been co-opted in this conflict in any creative fashion – there were pamphlets denouncing the French and describing conditions of English captives in their galleys, but nit imaginative work. *Tamerlane. A Tragedy*, appeared in 1702 after ir had been performed at the New Theater by His Majest's Servants. It is difficult to understand why Rowe chose the figure of Tamburlaine who had over a hundred yeas earlier been presented by Marlowe as a man of blood with an uncontrollable lust for conquest. After all, William was a very unpopular king – and a comparison with a ruthless conqueror might cut both ways. In the play, however, Rowe depicted him as the enemy of "Tyranny, of Bondage, and Oppression", marked by "our holy Allah" as a "Scourge lawless Pride and dire Ambition,/The great Avenger of the groaning World". His adversary, the Ottoman Bajazet, is burdened by "Tyranny, Opression, Insjustice,/ Perjury, Murders". Whatever the merits of such an analogy between the European monarchs and their Eastern predecessors, the play was a celebration of William III over Louis XIV both of whom were about to launch the War of the Spanish Succession.

(61) Simon Ockley, *An Account of South -West Barbary,* london, 1713.

ملخص:

تبلورت العلاقات بين المغرب وإنجلترا منذ عهد أحمد المنصور الذهبي والملكة إليزابيث الأولى، وتأكدت وترسخت من يوم احتلت إنجلترا جبل طارق (يوليوز 1704) أثناء ما يعرف في التاريخ بالحرب على العرش الإسباني 1700 - 1713 بين فرنسا واسبانيا من جهة، وبين إنجلترا من جهة أخرى. وما كانت إنجلترا لتحتفظ بجبل طارق منذ ذلك الحين لو لم يسعفها المولى إسماعيل بتموين الحامية الإنجليزية المكلفة بالدفاع عن تلك الصخرة بحاجتها من كل أسباب التموين، متشوفا إلى أن يساعده الأسطول الإنجليزي بحرا على استرجاع سبتة التي كانت يومئذ تحاصرها الجيوش المغربية برا. ولم تحرك إنجلترا من أجل ذلك ساكنا، لكنها ظلت متمسكة بحسن العلاقات مع المغرب، دعما لما أصبح لها من النفوذ في البحر الأبيض المتوسط بعد احتلال جبل طارق. وفي الوقت الذي توثقت فيه العلاقات بين البلدين للمدى الطويل اختفى ذكر المغرب في الكتابات الأدبية الإنجليزية أو كاد بعد أن كان بارزا في أيام شكسبير ومسرحية عطيل.