The Global Growth of *World History* Education

Evolution mondiale de l’enseignement de la *World History*

**Ross Edmunds Dunn**
Professor of History Emeritus
San Diego State University

**Abstract:** Scholars have been writing world histories since ancient times. But as a systematic course of study in educational institutions, world history dates only to the later nineteenth century. Since then, world history, also termed “global history,” has evolved as a type of cultural production, though varying significantly depending on the country. This article examines the history of world history as a modern educational movement. I contend that teachers and scholars in the United States “invented” world history education in the later 1800s. American models, though redefined several times, later influenced the germination of this subject in other parts of the world. Since about 1990 the founding of world history institutes, centers, and programs as both intellectual and pedagogical ventures has advanced significantly in Europe and East Asia. Unfortunately, the growth of world history education in the U.S. has for a number of reasons slowed. Moreover, world history studies have yet to take root in most countries worldwide. Further advances in this endeavor will require much time, research, and support. Essential questions must be addressed. Can there be a general consensus among educators regarding the definition of world history as a subject of learning? What sort of training do educators need? In what ways do public agencies encourage or inhibit world history education?

**Key words:** Big history, global history, history education, social studies, transnational history, universal history, western civilization, world history, world history curriculum, world history institutions, world history research, world history textbooks.

**Introduction**

World history as a topic of scholarship may be traced back to Herodotus, Qian Sima, Rashid al-Din, and other bygone sages. But as an organized course of study for the young, the world history dates only to the nineteenth century. This article examines the history of world history as a modern teaching subject and component of curricula in universities, colleges, K-12 schools, and other educational institutions in several parts of the world.¹ I argue that teachers and scholars in the United States pioneered this field of study about

¹. In American idiom, school from kindergarten through grade twelve is commonly referred to as “K-12.” I will occasionally use this term here, mainly because world history education in American schools is not limited to high school curriculum but often includes “middle schools” as well, usually years six through eight.
150 years ago. Moreover, American models of how to teach world history contributed to aroused interest in many other countries. I also contend that since about 1990 the founding of institutions, centers, and programs dedicated to the advancement of world history as both an intellectual and pedagogical endeavor have proliferated, especially in Europe and East Asia. Indeed, the institutionalizing of world history education in these two regions appears at present to be expanding more energetically than in the United States. The same cannot be said of other parts of Asia or of Africa, at least not yet.\(^2\) Given these developments, we may hope that schoolteachers and academic lecturers in more states in South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa will in the coming decades think more seriously about history education on interregional and global scales.

**The American Origins of World History Education**

From the mid-twentieth century to the past decade or two, educators in the United States have almost certainly committed more intellectual, administrative, and fiscal resources than professionals in any other country to the development of scholastic world history. This commitment has encompassed institutions from middle schools (children of ages eleven to thirteen) to doctorate-granting universities. Under what circumstances did significant numbers of educators muster great enthusiasm for world history earlier than in any other country? And how did the introduction of the subject to institutions of learning begin, especially from the 1980s forward, to challenge and disrupt the conventional units of study – nation-states, civilizations, and continents – in quite a few states around the world.

Consider how large an undertaking world history has become in the United States. Of the 15.1 million children who entered four years of high school in 2017, a large majority have been or will be enrolled in a mandatory one-year course titled “world history,” “global history,” “world civilizations,” or some other variant of the subject. In that year in California alone, nearly 964,000 children took world history in grades six and seven.\(^3\) In 2018, more than 2.7 million secondary students registered for the College Board’s Advanced Placement (AP) World History examination. The College Board

---


The Global Growth of World History Education

is a nonprofit organization that collaborates with colleges and universities to offer credit to incoming students who achieve qualifying scores in AP examinations in high school in any of more than forty subjects. In that year more than 313,000 students took the world history exam.4

I estimate that in the higher education sector in the past few years some tens of thousands of first- and second-year students enrolled in at least a one-term introductory world history course.5 Higher education includes not only four-year colleges and universities, both public and private, but also more than 1,450 two-year community colleges (or junior colleges). Today, collegiate institutions offer not only introductory surveys of the human past but also advanced undergraduate and graduate students a wide range of specialized courses that investigate historical problems having global, interregional, or comparative relevance.6 In a 2012 article, Heather Street Salter identified 53 institutions in the United States and Canada having master’s or PhD programs in world history.7 That number has probably risen somewhat since then. The National Endowment for the Humanities, as well as several private foundations, have supported world history graduate programs, as well as institutes and workshops for both K-12 and college students or instructors.

Why did world history make a place for itself in both school and university curricula earlier in the United States, least as far as I know, than in any other country. The practice of writing “universal histories,” a craft that originated in ancient millennia, continued into the twentieth century, exemplified by such writers as Oswald Spengler, H. G. Wells, and Arnold Toynbee. The late nineteenth-century European and North American proponents of a “New History,” however, demanded a discipline that was modern, professional, and

6. The word “college,” including its variants in different languages, has several common meanings. In the United States the word usually refers to relatively small institutions of high education, especially those that do not offer advanced degrees, as “universities” typically do. There are also two-year “community colleges” or “junior colleges” in all fifty states. They typically offer associate degrees or certificates in a variety of subjects, including general education, or core courses that students may transfer to four-year institutions. “College” is also a common term for an academic division within a university, for example, the “college of arts and letters.” In everyday speech, “college” may refer to any place of higher learning, as in “My daughter is going to college at Princeton University.” In this article I write “university” when not referring to a specific institution but also “collegiate” for any post-secondary (post high-school) institution.
dedicated to the “scientific” study of written documents, not amateur universal histories that were philosophical, speculative, and not rigorously constrained by rules of evidence. Moreover, American scholars and K-12 teachers argued that the growing numbers of boys and girls enrolling in the new high schools and academies springing up across the country needed to learn not only national history but also some type of “general history.” In his *Outlines of the World’s History*, a high school textbook published in 1874, William Swinton pledged to write for students “in the spirit of the modern method.” He also contended that general history “is of especial moment in our own country, as a preparation for citizenship in a free, self-governing nation: for how can we appreciate what we enjoy, unless we know how it came to be?”

This was an admirable rationale for writing a world history schoolbook. In those days, however, the definition of world history also conformed to publicly accepted doctrines of pseudo-scientific racism. Swinton affirmed that the “Aryan race” was “the only truly historical race” owing fundamentally to its biological superiority to all other races. The people who contrived nineteenth-century racial theory deployed all sorts of specialized vocabulary, scientific apparatus, and laboratory experimentation to validate their theories. The popularity of these claims also coincided neatly with the high period of European and American imperial expansion in Africa and Asia, an aggression that seemed to authenticate the special organic fitness of Aryan colonizers. Indeed, racism dressed up as science was commonly taught to children in classrooms and Sunday schools in Europe, the United States, and everywhere else where the descendants of Europeans lived. True to his times, Swinton declared that the Aryans “are peculiarly the race of progress; and a very large part of the history of the world must be taken up with an account of the contributions which the Aryan nations have made to the common stock of civilization.” Africans, Asians, and American Indians, he declared, had always been to one degree or another intellectually and culturally incapacitated. Their societies either existed permanently in a prehistoric state, or they constructed ancient civilizations that eventually reached cultural and intellectual stasis and eventually vanished. Swinton’s book included an initial section on “The Ancient Oriental Monarchies,” but then it shifted quickly westward to the story of Europe from ancient Greece and Rome to the 1870s.

---
The most hostile and ludicrous claims of race theorists lost some of their public currency after World War I. Nevertheless, a wide strand of cultural and social arrogance continued to run through both K-12 and collegiate curricula, whose institutions were almost universally governed by white males.12

The popularity of general history waned at the end of the century owing largely to an influential report of the American Historical Association (AHA), founded in 1884. In 1899, the association named a committee of seven men, most of them distinguished professors, to develop a national “new history” curriculum for high schools. It was to be founded on progressive principles, which meant replacing memorization and recitation with critical inquiry, lively discussion, and analysis of primary source documents. This Committee of Seven also recommended that general history, which they faulted for skimming across the surface of the past, give way to a four-year sequence of courses: ancient history, medieval and modern European history, English history, and United States history. The committee recommended brief review of Oriental civilizations but then more substantive study of Greece, Rome, and medieval Europe, implying at least that these were the sole places whose histories registered progressive change. Overt pseudoscientific racism was not evident in the committee’s curriculum, but it remained as Eurocentric as general history courses had been. The culturally arrogant presumptions of whose history mattered and whose did not continued to prevail.

World History, the Social Studies, and Western Civ

World War I and its aftermath had a significant impact on history education. The four-year high school bloc gradually gave way to a new kind of general history, usually called world history, designed for high schools, usually grade ten. This happened partly because postwar educationists, especially school administrators and public officials, advocated for what became known as “social studies,” a multidisciplinary curriculum that should have a place in every grade. These reformers argued that despite its progressive creed the four-year history sequence took up way too much school time. American participation in the war and the subsequent revival of mass foreign immigration demonstrated that schools must be well-managed, efficient institutions organized to produce well-informed, civic-minded men and women. Thus, history had to make room for geography, civics, current

12. Some general history textbooks included passing references to Asia and Africa in addition to the most ancient urban societies. For example, Philip V. N. Myers published a successful volume in 1889 that gave five pages each to India and China and ten to the early growth of Islam but 701 pages to ancient civilizations and Europe. Gilbert Allardyce, “Toward World History: American Historians and the Coming of the World History Course,” Journal of World History 1, no. 1 (1990): 46.
events, and other subjects designed to prepare the coming generation for productive careers. In effect, the old general history course was revived but now to be called world history and allotted only one year, usually grade ten.

The early twentieth century also saw the social sciences evolve into professional disciplines. The school reformers supported geographers, political scientists, economists, and sociologists who insisted on room in K-12 education. Social studies experts contended that a year each of high school American and world history had merit but that these courses should emphasize the modern and contemporary. If world history teachers wanted to explain ancient Egypt and the medieval Catholic church, they would have to squeeze those topics into the tenth grade without slighting coverage of the recent past. Erudite champions of the four-year history bloc scorned these developments. But they proved no match for the new social studies managers. Gradually losing interest in the struggle, university historians generally turned away from K-12 education altogether.13

Another significant postwar development was the rise of the college course usually named “history of Western civilization,” or for short, “Western Civ.” In 1919, a band of scholars at Columbia College introduced a first-year undergraduate course titled Contemporary Civilization, which subsequently provided an early model for Western Civ in other institutions. Its academic founders had a mix of motives for requiring the course of all of their undergraduates. For one thing, postwar foreign policy leaders felt impelled to firm up U.S. membership in the club of liberal democratic nations, thus identifying America’s relatively young institutions with Europe’s older republican and constitutional traditions. Another motive addressed the problem of assimilating immigrants of all origins to shared America’s Europe-derived civic and cultural values. According to Daniel Segal, the authors of early Western Civ textbooks aimed to help restore the “rational inquiry” that had undergirded democratic states before the Great War and to prepare thinking citizens to defend humankind against the return of the authoritarian and irrational behavior that had produced that horrendous conflict.14

Like the high school world history syllabus and the new textbooks supporting it, the Western Civ program was to direct students to more than the

---

The Global Growth of World History Education

contemporary or modern eras. It was also to include topics on “prehistoric,” ancient, and medieval history. Ideally, the course presented a lucid, seamless narrative of the progressive advance of Man from prehistoric African savannas to the ancient Middle East, Egypt, Greece, and Rome, and then westward to Europe – with some attention to the United States and to the European imperial conquerors and settlers who presumably introduced civilization to immobile dynasties and heathen tribes in Africa, Asia, and the Americas. Because the narrative passed through the western “Orient,” it sometimes included the first two or three centuries of Islam. Early Muslims were credited with possessing at least some identifiable history owing to their place as links in the chain of human moral and material progress. Segal calls Western Civ a social evolutionary construction. In this view of things, “cultures do not cross, they fall in line…” In that light, the world historian William McNeill observed that the founders of Western Civ were influenced by nineteenth-century British thinkers to regard “all history as moving towards the realization of human freedom.” That was to be Western Civ’s central theme. Thus, most teachers and textbook authors taught both high school world history and college Western Civ without telling their students that the narrative they were describing was not world history at all.

Paralleling the high school course, Western Civ spread across the United States in the interwar period. One reason for its success was general education (GE), an innovation that required first and second year university students to take a basic list of courses – mostly in the humanities, arts, social sciences, and natural sciences – to equip them with critical skills and wide-ranging knowledge. As one Columbia professor observed, GE was to be “a common core of learning for the common man.” Partly out of worry that high schools were failing to properly prepare students to complete bachelors’ and graduate degrees, most universities bought readily into GE. Furthermore, states and localities began in the 1930s to support “community colleges.” These postsecondary two-year institutions offered associate degrees or certificates in a range of subjects, both academic and vocational. They also taught most of the GE courses, including U.S. history and Western Civ, that the universities to which many students eventually transferred required.

American instructors and their students may have found Western Civ a reasonably satisfying experience, at least at first. They were invited to explore important developments on a fairly large scale of time and space. Teachers could encourage them to think of Europe as in many respects an integrated cultural unit, rather than a large collection of bounded nation-states, each with a self-contained past. As a multinational whole, Europe bequeathed to America ancient philosophy, the Christian church, the Renaissance, and Industrial Revolution, and other progressive achievements. Western Civ also typically offered brief expositions of Western art, architecture, and literature.

Piling on numerous topics, however, had the effect of obliterating the original “march of freedom” organizing principle. The profession was exploding with new subjects, problems, methods, and approaches – a candy store of knowledge to somehow be crammed into an academic semester or two. Not only did students grumble about mountains of testable detail, but senior lecturers occupied with their research often foisted the course on junior colleagues or graduate students. At the high school level world history students tackling mostly the European past and not the whole globe nonetheless faced similar diminishing narrative coherence. Nevertheless, high school world history and collegiate Western Civ together remained the preeminent non-American history courses in the United States for at least thirty-five years after World War II. Enrollments in the high school course, for example, grew from about 12 percent of all students in grades nine through twelve in 1934 to more than 69 percent by 1961, that is, about 1.5 million mostly tenth-graders.19

Redefining World History Education after World War II

Despite the endurance of Western Civ and secondary world history as spatially truncated forms of world history, some teachers pointed out their inadequacy for the postwar decades. The narrow nationalism to which so many Americans reverted after World I did not repeat itself after the second conflict. Rather the majority of citizens accepted the necessity of American world leadership, recognizing that the war and its aftermath made the planet simultaneously smaller as an interacting social sphere and larger in the collective consciousness of peoples almost everywhere. A bigger world awareness required a bigger world history.

The rationales for rethinking world history education came from several directions. One was the nationalist movements that took hold in European dependencies before or after World War II, including in some places violent wars of liberation. These upheavals disrupted the prevailing world order

enough to stir the American public, which previously had little knowledge of India, Algeria, or Southern Rhodesia, to pay attention. A second factor was the Cold War. Many Americans realized that they knew much less about the Bolshevik Revolution, the Romanov empire, Cuba, or Vietnam than they and their older children ought to know. These global conditions moved thinkers in some universities, K-12 schools, and civic organizations to demand more international education, if not necessarily the full sweep of human history. The Cold War, for example, prompted the U.S. Congress to pass the National Defense Education Act in 1958. This legislation funded battalions of graduate students to take up “areas studies,” that is, to learn the languages, history, culture, and economy of African, Asian, or Latin American states and to go forth to research and write dissertations that would presumably serve the national interest.

In the 1970s, some of the young area studies PhDs who acquired university jobs proposed to teach introductory world history of global scope, at least as an alternative to Western Civ. Several other factors also spurred these initiatives. One was the great expansion of historical and social scientific knowledge about every world region, knowledge that shattered tired myths about inert civilizations, “traditional societies,” and torpid tribes. Another was the social and ethnoracial broadening of faculties to include young women and men who much preferred world history to Western Civ, a narrative that inevitably privileged light-skinned societies. Finally, in the 1980s and 1990s, the “culture wars” in the United States that provoked liberal and leftist citizens, especially students, to fight for, among many other reforms, more socially and culturally inclusive K-12 and college curricula, included demands for courses that embraced the ancestors of all American ethnoracial groups, in other words, world history.

Nevertheless, the pursuit of new programs and textbooks proved challenging. Few teachers had great confidence in their ability to design courses that would span the globe but not end up even more fact-stuffed and unwieldy than Western Civ had become. One problem was that model courses and scholarly studies to provide guidance were scarce. Fortunately, however, the works of several pioneering world historians offered blueprints for conceptualizing and structuring accounts of the human past.

Among them, William H. McNeill should be invoked first. He constructed his monumental 1963 work *The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community* around the development of major civilizations. McNeill, however, explored in detail the processes and consequences of interactions among those societies, drawing on cultural diffusion theory to argue that

---
encounters of one society “with bearers of another culture or civilization is sure to change local ways of life. This was and remains, in my opinion, the main drive wheel of historical change.” McNeill produced many other books of world historical significance, and he energetically campaigned for stronger world history education throughout his long career. Writing in *The History Teacher* in 1977, McNeill declared that even though the Western Civ course had lost any clear rationale or organizing principle, a basic course for all students was nonetheless imperative. “I must confess that it seems to me self-evident… that the only frame suitable for introducing students to the world in which they live is world history.”

Leften Stavrianos, a second key innovator, became concerned in the 1950s that Americans did not appear to understand the global crises of the time, impelling him to speak up for a renewed partnership between academic specialists and high school teachers. He was a historian at Northwestern University when in 1962 he published a high school world history, one of the first textbooks that challenged the Eurocentric narrative. His book took a civilizationist but worldwide approach, and he paid some attention to interregional connections. Being ahead of its time, this book at first had limited influence on tenth-grade world history. But Stavrianos persisted, producing new editions and within a few years a college world history that offered a conceptual guide for new instructors.

In 1959 Philip Curtin, a third pioneer worthy of mention, founded the Comparative Tropical History (later Comparative World History) graduate program at the University of Wisconsin. This was the first curriculum of its kind. In contrast to McNeill and Stavrianos, Curtin questioned the value of sweeping world history surveys. Rather, he urged a worldwide frame for investigating the history of trade, migration, slavery, disease, and numerous other potential topics by applying a methodology of inductive comparison of individual cases. Curtin had great success training graduate students to teach, write, and lay institutional foundations for world history education.

Many of his students, including myself, initiated first-year surveys in our universities. But we learned from Curtin to think about teaching, not in terms of “covering” regions and civilizations, but as addressing specific historical problems in world-historical contexts.26

Finally, Marshall G. S. Hodgson had an earlier but much shorter career as a world history theorist. He was a colleague of McNeill’s at the University of Chicago when he died suddenly in 1968 at the age of 46. His masterwork, The Venture of Islam, appeared in three volumes six years after his death, but he wrote his seminal articles on world history in the 1950s.27 These essays are close to clairvoyant in their anticipation of the world-historical reconceptualization in progress today. Like McNeill, Hodgson accepted the reality of civilizations as cultural aggregates, but ultimately, he had less interest in them as distinct cultural totalities than he had in the whole of Afroeurasia as an enormous zone of complex and ever-changing interactions among human groups. In The Venture of Islam he viewed Afroeurasia (or Afro-Eurasia, as he spelled it) as the proper spatial context for comprehending the elaboration of Muslim societies, as well as other large-scale developments that might alter human relations across the entire transhemispheric region. For Hodgson, conceiving of Afroeurasia as a kind of supercontinent could free historians to explore developments without letting constructed geographical or civilizational boundaries get in their way.28

The achievements of McNeill, Stavrianos, Curtin, and Hodgson continue today to inspire the shaping of world history as a creditable field of learning. Other thinkers who started making scholarly contributions to the discipline during its early years of development (before 1985) include Michael Adas, Fernand Braudel, Alfred Crosby, Daniel Headrick, Kevin Reilly, Lynda Shaffer, Peter Stearns, and Immanuel Wallerstein.


28. On the cognitive construction of continents and many other spatialities that we have falsely regarded as existing in nature, see Martin W. Lewis and Kären Wigen, The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).
In the 1980s, several college publishers began to advertise world history textbooks that boasted global coverage. By this time, they knew they had to market world history alternatives to their Western Civ products. All of these early textbook writers adopted, at least as far as I know, the McNeill and Stavrianos civilizational model, though most of them also included discussion of societal interactions. Why, however, did college instructors largely replace Eurocentrism with Europe plus a number of other “regional centrisms,” each of these having its own internal chronology? Why did they not develop more unilinear, integrated global narratives? One reason was the lingering professional principle that either nation-states or regional “cultures” were the obvious, natural containers for investigating the human past. Another and commonly heard rationale was that students should focus on long-term continuities within regional units in order to understand their internal histories and cultural forms. Only then would they be prepared to inquire into connections between them. This reasoning, however, assumed that civilizations and cultures developed as they did largely irrespective of events in other places near or far, an assertion that world historical research could no longer sustain.

A third factor that helped privilege civilizationist world history was the American multiculturalist movement of the 1960s and following decades. Multiculturalism, defined basically as the appreciation of American social and cultural diversity, emerged as a fairly benign educational idea. By the 1980s, however, it became an ideological weapon in the passionate culture wars that continue to smolder even today. The political left wanted both K-12 schools and universities to pay much more attention to the culture and history of women and to minority ethnoracial groups. Multiculturalism did help advance world history because it demanded both global inclusivity. Even so, advocates tended to emphasize the “multi” in multicultural and thus a conception of world history as essentially the serial study of different civilizations and peoples. Politically conservative observers countered that teaching diversity was not a bad thing but that too much of it threatened to divide the country into mutually uncomprehending factions and to marginalize the great traditions that came from Europe alone. These public quarrels tended, whether consciously or not, to reinforce inclinations to reify named aggregates of people, as if every ethnoracial group in the United States, and in every civilization elsewhere, represented a homogenous category. For the most part, world history curricula and textbooks accepted these presuppositions rather than challenging them as historicized constructions.
Civilizationism vs Humanocentric History

The world was changing too fast, however, for conceptions of world history – or any other educational field – to remain static. Michael Geyer and Charles Bright have described what they call our “condition of globality,” the idea that in the past few decades the planet has not only become a single arena of intense, dynamic interaction among humans in nearly all spheres of life but also that most of the world’s population has become in some measure conscious of this state of affairs and its implications. Educators are no doubt among the most acutely aware of the acceleration of change – the unceasing movement of people around the world, the production and flow of information, the thickening of exchange networks, the advent of social media, and the perpetual restructuring of the world economy. These extraordinary developments have compelled historians and social scientists to reflect on the global past in more holistic and spatially flexible terms. Back in the mid-1980s, the anthropologist Eric Wolf asked, “If there are connections everywhere, why do we persist in turning dynamic, interconnected phenomena into static, disconnected things?... By endowing nations, societies, or cultures with the qualities of internally homogeneous and externally distinctive and bounded objects, we create a model of the world as a global pool hall in which the entities spin off each other like so many hard and round billiard balls.”

Some world history practitioners understood Wolf’s billiard ball critique, concluding that the definition of their field as the study of different cultures had outlived its usefulness. Nevertheless, rethinking world history for the age in which we live progressed slowly, partly because a broad, persuasive research base began to accrue only in the 1980s. World historians have often observed that the field’s teaching project nourished research more richly than the other way round. Indeed, the pressure on curriculum writers and textbook publishers to detach world history from the Western meganarrative exceeded scholarly energy devoted to new studies in interregional, comparative, and global subjects. Much of the exciting scholarship in world history has come from scholars who were teaching the subject before they wrote about it. Philip Curtin, for example, started teaching world-scale comparative history at the University of Wisconsin before publishing books that contributed to the field. “I have already raided my lectures for [The World and the West] course to publish two books,” Curtin wrote in 1991, “one on cross-cultural trade and one on plantations.”

---

Whether teaching or research came first, the library of books and articles on world historical topics grew at a quickening pace. Notwithstanding the continuing quest to make the entire human venture more intelligible, young scholars knew well that writing world history was not the same thing as writing histories of the world. They saw the potential of world-historical research partly because they already possessed global sensibilities, knew the social sciences, and grasped the significance of the entanglement between the human and the non-human organic and environmental pasts. They were therefore willing to pose questions in the economic, social, ecological, and several other spheres of inquiry that invited and indeed demanded cross-regional or comparative frames of analysis.

World historians came to embrace the idea that certain research topics could be investigated in their full proportions only if the choice of geographical context did not fence in the historical problem at hand. For example, Fernand Braudel provided the seminal model of what some have called “basin history” with his integrative study of the sixteenth-century Mediterranean. Many others have subsequently studied that region as a distinct zone of historical development. Philip Curtin and Alfred Crosby were both architects of the idea that the lands facing the Atlantic Ocean constituted what Curtin has called “a relevant aggregate” of data and human interrelationships. Subsequently, Atlantic basin history grew into an important subdiscipline. Soon enough, historians began to teach and write about other interregional basins, notably the Indian Ocean, the Pacific, the Sahara Desert, and the Eurasian steppes, all places where the histories of people, goods, ideas, and climates became profoundly entangled. Basin history, however, has been just one of the ways of thinking about units of space in ways that serve the investigation of historical problems rather than the other way around. The late Adam McKeown wrote that making sense of the global past requires spatial malleability: “It is hard to imagine a genuinely global explanatory narrative emerging while

---

our knowledge remains divided into familiar geographic units. The units that make up those narratives may instead have to be chronological, event-centered, network-centered, or rooted in geographical spaces other than those framed by area studies.35

Configuring historical space in more creative ways has also obliged scholars to pay more attention to variable scales of space, time, and process in raising research or teaching questions. Critics of world history as a feasible subject used to protest (and may still do) that history at the global or even interregional scale is too dim or nebulous to be usefully investigated. The profession has been learning, however, that moving from small to large scales of time or space does not mean that we see fewer and hazier patterns but rather that we see different ones. Participants in a world history conference held in Boston in 2006 offered a succinct definition of world history education that emphasizes investigation on varying scales: “At the most general level, the phrase ‘world history’ expresses a willingness to move beyond existing national, regional, and chronological frameworks, to experiment with a variety of different conceptual, spatial, and temporal scales that raise new types of questions and encourage new forms of comparative and interactive study.”36

In his seminal article on “big history” published in 1991, David Christian argued that “what is central at one scale may be detail at another and may vanish entirely at the very largest scales. Some questions require the telephoto lens; others require the wide-angle lens.”37 Indeed, Christian pushed the logic of this observation to its final limit, we might say, when he argued that the ultimate context for human history is not the earth in the paleolithic era but the cosmos.38 In 1989, he introduced a first-year course in what he called Big History at Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia. The course required students to comprehend change on multiple scales, including very large ones (starting with the Big Bang), and to tackle questions formulated by researchers

in the historical sciences, including cosmology, geology, evolutionary biology, as well as by historians and social scientists. The aims of big history require that students keep an eye trained on panoramic pictures in human history throughout the course, such as the significance of global environmental change or long-term, large-scale migrations in different eras. Big history allowed deep dives into civilizations and nation-states but mostly to help illustrate, exemplify, or provide evidence for larger-scale historical claims. Big history has recently evolved into an educational movement. Courses are taught in universities in several countries. And an enterprise founded by Microsoft’s Bill Gates supports big history programs in high schools, more than 1,500 of them in the United States and several in other countries.

The proliferation of advanced undergraduate and graduate world history courses in the United States includes interregional histories; transnational phenomena; studies of hemispheric or global change within particular periods; comparative investigations of agrarian regimes, trade, religions, and numerous other topics; and seminars on the historiography of world history as a field of inquiry. These advanced studies have stimulated further innovative thinking about ways to achieve what Andre Gunder Frank called “humanocentric” history. This approach requires that *Homo sapiens* has the leading part rather than a cast of culture groups. It also demands that the whole earth be the primary spatial context for exploring the past. Humans should be identified first as members of a particular animal species and then, on relatively smaller scales of time and place, as affiliates of clans, states, empires, migrating populations, merchant companies, big corporations, and numerous other aggregates. Such a global approach should not, however, marginalize the local, the biographical, the specific case, or indeed the civilizational, as long as the potential relevance of the global or other broad context is kept in mind.

Teaching world history from a humanocentric perspective is of course challenging. It benefits much from a coherent structural plan and a willingness to omit altogether much detail, including perhaps cherished topics. To envision the course as mainly a matter of topical “coverage” is likely to repeat the worst deficiencies of Western Civ. In my view instructors might approach the subject in undergraduate and indeed high school classrooms the way graduate seminars typically do, not by linear coverage of topics, but by

---

formulating and addressing historical questions, or problems, including ones that are large-scale in time, space, and subject. Most history professionals in the United States agree that teachers at all educational levels must guide their students to proficiency not only in “content knowledge” but also in critical analytical skills. These skills should include not only interrogation of primary documents but also strategies for articulating plausible historical claims on different scales and then testing those claims by gathering and analyzing evidence. In the past two or three decades, sophisticated research on the cognitive processes that students deploy in pondering historical subjects demonstrates that regular practice to connect analytically specific events and details to larger frames of meaning may improve both critical skills and content knowledge.

Over the millennia humans have formed all sorts of historically significant groups that have acted on spatial and time scales that do not fit within convention units of investigation. The movement for what some have called the “new world history” has given teachers and researchers leave to break with those conventions. As they have done this, they have discovered myriad new questions and problems that earlier generations never addressed or even perceived. Referring to the twentieth century, Patrick Manning has noted, “the problem is not with studies of nations but that the national framework constrained... historians to limit their research and writing.” 41 And, I would add, their teaching.

Institutions to Advance World History Education

World history became an educational movement in the 1980s not only because men and women taught the subject but also because professionals laid platforms of institutional support. In 1982, a small band of educators launched the World History Association (WHA). From the start the membership worked to advance the field by sponsoring annual meetings, symposia, workshops, a members’ inhouse newsletter, and in 1990 the Journal of World History (JWH). In contrast to most academic associations until quite recently, the WHA made bridge-building between K-12 and collegiate educators a key part of its mission. Beginning in 1984, collegiate and precollegiate teachers cooperated to found several regional affiliates of the WHA, which organize their own activities.

In the 1980s and 1990s, when demand for secondary and college world history instructors was growing fast, several universities established graduate

---

programs. As mentioned earlier, Philip Curtin founded the first one at the University of Wisconsin in 1959. Twenty-six years later Jerry Bentley and colleagues at the University of Hawaii introduced a secondary Ph.D. field in world history. From then on, the number of advanced programs in global, interregional, or comparative history began to accelerate. Many of these programs combined in one way or another the training of research scholars, the preparation of both K-12 and collegiate teachers in world history beyond the introductory level, and the integration of historical research methods with those of other disciplines, not only the social sciences and humanities, but also archaeology, linguistics, genetics, and climatology.

K-12 world history education received a heavy dose of public attention in 1994, when the National Center for History in the Schools (NCHS) at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) published federally funded national subject matter and critical skill standards for both U.S. and world history at the K-12 level. The project involved dozens of teachers and professional or civic associations. The designers of the world history guidelines chose a conceptual architecture based on investigation of successive global eras rather than on civilizational studies in sequence. The new standards faced an assault from the political right for presumably devaluing national ideals, inspiring stories, and Western achievements in favor of multiculturalism, critiques of patriotic narratives, and “politically correct” attention to ethnoracial minorities and non-Western parts of the world. The controversy also drew much favorable public attention to both U.S. and world history education and encouraged thousands of teachers to make profitable use of the standards in classrooms. In 2001, the San Diego State University history department in collaboration with the NCHS launched World History for Us All (WHFUA), an online model curriculum for world history in middle and high schools. Thousands of teachers use this extensive resource, which continues under development today.

A few other institutional developments are worth noting. In 1994, H-World, a free electronic list for discussion of world history scholarship and education, was founded, and at George Mason University the Center for History and New Media (now the Roy Rosenzweig Center) was launched to “preserve and present history online,” including document resources and up-

---

43. World History for Us All, Public History Initiative/National Center for History in the Schools, UCLA, http://worldhistoryforusall.ss.ucla.edu. I have served as director of this project since its inception in 2001.
to-date news on world history.\textsuperscript{44} In 2003, the electronic journal \textit{World History Connected} came online to support teaching and research in the field and “to bridge the long-standing divide between teachers in secondary and post-secondary education.”\textsuperscript{45} Finally, world history teachers and scholars gathered at UCLA in 2012 to create the Alliance for Learning in World History, an association now based at the University of Pittsburgh dedicated to improving world history education in middle and high schools.\textsuperscript{46}

\textbf{World History Education in Europe}

In terms of the sheer numbers of students relative to total population engaged in world history education at all levels of study, the United States has no close competitors to date. Nevertheless, this state of affairs is by no means static. My sampling of institutions in several countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa suggests that in the past three decades scholars and teachers have created a remarkable number of new programs and institutes to serve the field. In Europe world history as an academic subject barely existed anywhere at any educational level as recently as 1990. Since then, however, university professionals have founded a remarkable number of entities in single universities or as multi-university collaborations, as well as professional organizations and online networks. These endeavors have variously identified their mission as world, global, transnational, or universal history.

The German historian Katya Naumann links this surge of academic innovation to a sharpened sensitivity to world-scale change following the unanticipated collapse of the post-World War II political order after 1989. More European scholars and educators have paid attention to the accelerating complexity of global interconnections, the widening of Europe’s political integration (until recently), and the European Union’s (EU) aspiration to shape a new European identity, partly by encouraging both regional and global studies as a counterweight to nationalist preoccupations. In surveying the state of world history education as of 2012, Naumann identified “countless programs of academic study, research centers, networks, and forums on world-historical problems and issues.”\textsuperscript{47} These activities have only multiplied since then.

\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{44} Roy Rosenzweig Center for History and New Media, https://rrchnm.org.
  \item\textsuperscript{45} “World History Is Here,” \textit{World History Connected} 1, no. 1 (2003), http://worldhistoryconnected.press.uillinois.edu/1.1/editorial.html.
  \item\textsuperscript{46} World History Center, Department of History, University of Pittsburgh, https://www.worldhistory.pitt.edu/.
\end{itemize}
In striving to establish these institutions, historians have encountered resistance, especially from members of the academy wedded to the idea of nation-states as the prime foci of research and teaching. But similarly to many American professionals, Europeans who just a few years ago might have regarded introductory world history for undergraduates or secondary school students an outlandish idea have in some measure changed their views. The growing number of young scholars with research expertise on non-Europe regions, the EU integrationist ideology, and the rise of financial support from the EU and other funding bodies have encouraged projects to institutionalize world history education, as their American counterparts started to do a decade or so earlier. The surge of world historical literature coming from the United States has also significantly influenced European research. Writing in 2011, Dominic Sachsenmaier notes that “a recently published German essay collection on global and transnational history consists almost exclusively of articles previously published in the United States. This shows that research trends on the other side of the Atlantic are an important benchmark for many global historians in Germany.”

Institution formation in Europe has opened opportunities for fresh cohorts of world history researchers and graduate students, cadres that display considerable national, linguistic, and gender diversity. Today, centers for advanced research in world history by one name or another exist in Austria, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Russia, Spain, the Netherlands, and perhaps other states. European entities that sponsor both world-historical research and graduate training may now exceed the number of similar institutions in the United States.

A few examples illustrate the proliferation of centers and programs. In Germany alone, there were by 2012 at least seven universities offering graduate degrees in global or transnational history and related disciplines. The University of Leipzig’s Global and European Studies Institute (GESI), founded in 2008, coordinates a consortium of universities that offers a two-year master’s degree program titled Global Studies–A European Perspective. The curriculum includes significant attention to world-scale history. In addition to Leipzig, the founding institutions of the GESI were the University of Vienna, the University of Wroclaw in Poland, and the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Today, the consortium embraces

twelve universities, six of them in European states and one each in Australia, Canada, China, India, South Africa, and the United States. Leipzig also directs an interdisciplinary and international PhD program emphasizing innovative approaches to the spatial dimensions of change on regional, transnational, and global scales.\textsuperscript{51}

In England the LSE has published the Journal of Global History (JGH) since 2006. In their mission statement in the inaugural issue, the founding editors announced that the journal’s attention to “processes of globalization” signified “a subtle difference between the closely related endeavors of global and world history.”\textsuperscript{52} Perhaps so, though a comparison of the first eight issues of the JGH with eight issues of the JWH in the corresponding years indicates few conspicuous differences in content except for the JGH’s greater number of articles that address post-1900 topics.\textsuperscript{53} At the University of Warwick the Global History and Culture Centre, created in 2007 as a research and teaching institute, offers a Master’s in Global and Comparative History and encourages PhD research in the field.\textsuperscript{54} At the University of Oxford, students may earn an MA in Global and Imperial History through the Centre for Global History established in 2011.\textsuperscript{55} In the Netherlands, Leiden University’s history department awards a Master of Arts degree in Colonial and Global History.\textsuperscript{56} Open Programmes at the University of Amsterdam offers two courses in Big History.\textsuperscript{57}

European scholars have also initiated multinational organizations to advance world historical knowledge and professional exchange. The Global Economic History Network (GEHN) was created in 2003 as a partnership of LSE, Leiden University, Osaka University, and the University of California (Irvine and Los Angeles) to promote communication and collaboration among individual scholars. The grant supporting GEHN’s research, meetings, and visiting fellowships ended in 2006, but network membership, which reached

\textsuperscript{51} University of Leipzig, Graduate school of Global and Area Studies, home.uni-leipzig.de.
\textsuperscript{54} University of Warwick, Global History and Culture Centre Center, MA in Global History, https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/arts/history/ghcc/teaching/.
\textsuperscript{55} University of Oxford, Oxford Centre for Global History, MSt in Global and Imperial History, https://global.history.ox.ac.uk/mst-global-and-imperial-history.
\textsuperscript{56} Leiden University, Colonial and Global History (research) (MA), https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/en/education/study-programmes/master/history-research/colonial-and-global-history-research.
nearly fifty individuals in eleven countries, continues informal exchanges.\textsuperscript{58} In 2002, the European Network in Universal and Global History (ENIUGH) was established as an international association to promote research, teaching, and professional discussion.\textsuperscript{59} The network has sponsored six academic congresses since 2005, most recently in 2017 in Budapest. It also publishes two journals, \textit{Comparativ: A Journal for Global History and Comparative Studies} and its electronic companion \textit{Connections: A Journal for Historians and Area Specialists}. In 2008 the foundational meeting of the Network of Global and World History Organizations (NOGWHISTO) took place in Dresden. This consortium aims to facilitate discussion and cooperation among world regional associations. Although its activities and institutional development have been limited to date, five world history organizations are NOGWHISTO members: ENIUGH, the WHA, the Asian Association of World Historians (AAWH), the African Network in Global History (ANGH), and the International Big History Association, which held its inaugural conference in Italy in 2010.\textsuperscript{60}

Regarding precollegiate education, national and European history continues to loom over state curricular mandates, in contrast to the near universality of world history requirements in American K-12 schools. Some European academics and secondary teachers, however, have begun to take an interest in high school world history. The mission statement of ENIUGH recognizes “education in schools” as one of its important activities.\textsuperscript{61} Dominic Sachsenmaier has observed that in recent years “there have been lively debates on how to introduce global or world historical perspectives into German university education. There are similar projects targeting high school history education, from which non-Western or world history traditionally has been virtually absent.”\textsuperscript{62}

There are, however, myriad differences in middle and high school curricula from one European state to another, as one would expect. France and England illustrate this variety. In France the national curriculum is largely Eurocentric, but some moderate room is made for transregional and Asian history. Revisions currently underway in the national system require students at the \textit{collège} level (ages thirteen to fifteen) to address a period encompassing

\textsuperscript{58} London School of Economics, Department of Economic History, Global Economic History Network, http://www.lse.ac.uk/Economic-History/Research/GEHN/Global-Economic-History-Network-GEHN; Shigeru Akira, personal communication, Osaka University, Aug. 6, 2019.
\textsuperscript{59} University of Leipzig, European Network in Universal and Global History, http://research.uni-leipzig.de/~eniugh/.
\textsuperscript{60} Network of Global and World History Organizations, https://research.uni-leipzig.de/~gwhisto/home/.
\textsuperscript{61} http://research.uni-leipzig.de/~eniugh/mission-statement/.
\textsuperscript{62} Sachsenmaier, \textit{Global Perspectives}, 164.
human origins through the formation of early urban societies. Medieval studies are European except for one unit on relations between “Christianity and Islam.” Youths who go on to lycées (ages fifteen to eighteen) are introduced in their first year to cross-cultural and integrative approaches when they study the Mediterranean and its rim lands from the ancient era through the sixteenth century. In year two they study international relations according to a thematic plan that gives some attention to Asian countries and the United States. Designated study of African or Latin American history is barely to be found. And there is no broad world history survey approaching the American model.

In England the ministry of education has in recent years devalued history in general compared to its place in the original national curriculum of 1991. Today, students in state schools study no history at all after age fourteen, unless they choose British and European history as an A-level subject to qualify for university admission. In the curriculum that includes students from ages seven to eleven (Key Stage 2), world history is awarded three classroom topics: 1) ancient history that prescribes “depth study” of just one society chosen among Sumer, the Indus Valley, Egypt, and the Shang Dynasty; 2) ancient Greece; and 3) one non-European society selected from early Islamic civilization, Mayan civilization, or Benin in West Africa. For students between twelve and fourteen years (Key Stage 3), the compulsory syllabus is almost entirely British and European history, except for the vague directive to engage in “at least one study of a significant society or issue in world history and its interconnections with other world developments.” For this unit four “world history” topics are suggested as possible options: Mughal India, China’s Qing Dynasty, the Russian empire after 1800, or the United States in the twentieth century. This requirement appears to be the only one anywhere in the national curriculum where world historical “interconnections” are mentioned. In the final two years (Key Stage 4) before students take the exam for the General Certificate of Secondary Education, the history discipline is absent entirely. In addition to the dearth of world history in the national curriculum, teachers may apparently present the few non-European topics that are required without regard for larger-scale contexts. Thus, Shang China, Mayan society, and Benin drift freely in global space in the enduring tradition of world history as siloed civilizations.

**World History Education in East Asia**

The scholarly works and textbooks on world history produced in China, Japan, and Korea before the 1980s either surveyed “foreign” societies or described Europe’s rise to global power. Writers drawn to the “rise of the West” problem, a group that included Marxist intellectuals, juxtaposed Europe against their own country. In general, these books contended that their nation should be modernizing but was failing to keep pace with the West owing to a combination of internal disadvantages and Western imperial pressures. Writers of early Western Civ and high school world history textbooks in the United States assumed that the unique and unassailable achievements of Western civilization qualified it as the only sensible way of representing the history of humankind. By contrast, classroom texts in these three East Asian states grappled with the rise of the West as a phenomenon deserving of appreciation. But for them, because the West was clearly not the world, its ascendancy was a complicated problem to be untangled.

In China after 1949 and especially during the Great Cultural Revolution of 1966-1976, world historical writing and teaching adhered closely to the Soviet Union’s Marxist-Leninist blueprint, contrasting China’s revolutionary path with the West’s bourgeois ideology and exploitive capitalism. Thus, world-scale histories remained largely absorbed in the story of Western global success and of China’s relative inertia in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, despite its having been the world’s largest economy during the previous 2,000 years. But after 1976 and the Communist Party’s proclamation of its “opening up policy,” scholars gained freer rein to discuss the past and future of China’s modernization and its political role among the world’s major powers. Owing in part to the country’s growing influence in world affairs, the rapid expansion of universities, and the widening opportunities for international travel and exchange, some academics ventured to question the old “what went wrong” theme in world historical writing and debate. China’s widening international involvement exposed scholars to the corpus of mostly anglophone literature that challenged Eurocentric world history by positing new configurations of historical time and space, designing sophisticated comparative analyses, and proposing new explanations of Western power in world-scale contexts. New Chinese works on the historiography of world history also acknowledged Marx’s considerable contributions to the field.

Scholarly and teaching interest in what Chinese academics have consistently labeled “global history,” (or its Chinese language equivalent), rather than “world history,” mushroomed in the 1990s. According to Yunshen
Gu at Shanghai’s Fudan University, this trend originated in 1988 with the publication of a Chinese edition of L. S. Stavrianos’ work *A Global History*, which was still a popular textbook for American students. Following the quinquennial Congress of Historical Sciences in 1995 and 2000, where global history figured as an important topic, Chinese academics took a new interest, “inviting scholars from abroad, founding new institutions, hosting forums, and translating works of global history.”65 Indeed, Fudan University’s history department has developed rich global history programs for both undergraduates and graduates, and its faculty includes several outstanding world historians.

Nankai University is the site of another established world history program that according to Zhang Weiwei, endeavors to privilege a holistic approach, taking “the globe as the single unit of analysis in global history. Global history is all within one eggshell…”66 Nankai offers both undergraduate and MA students major programs in world history. The founding of the AAWH took place there in 2008. Probably the most prominent institute in China is the Global History Center at Capital Normal University in Beijing. Founded in 2004, the center accommodates nearly a dozen research scholars and teachers who staff both MA and PhD programs.67 The center also publishes the Chinese-language *Global History Review* and in 2011 hosted the annual conference of the WHA. A notable feature of these developments in China is that on the whole the global history movement’s leaders shifted from an ambivalent acceptance of a Eurocentric conceptual structure, especially for the modern centuries, to an even greater enthusiasm for humankind as the primary arena of investigation than has so far taken place in the United States. And notwithstanding some attention to regional units, they accomplished this without passing through the years of multiculturalist-inspired civilizationism that characterized American world history education.

Japan and Korea both have traditions of writing and translating world histories going back to the nineteenth century. The ideological disposition


of these early writings, especially textbooks, changed over the decades, depending on the prevailing political regime. In the years following Japan’s Meiji Restoration (1868), both Japanese and Korean intellectuals struggled with problems of modernizing their state while preserving its freedom from European intrusion. In the process world history became a useful concept. The subject was understood, however, to refer mainly to East Asia and Europe. World history textbooks introduced to Japan from the United States or Britain before the end of the century, and then translated into Japanese, had a large influence on intellectuals and educators, though knowledge of these books was limited mostly to literate elite families. William Swinton’s *Outlines of the World’s History* (1874), discussed earlier as a textbook founded on pseudoscientific racist ideology, defined civilization as synonymous with European ideas of nation, liberty, democracy, and race. Japanese scholars began to publish world histories that largely acknowledged this narrative as a model for their country’s political and economic advancement. In the late Meiji period, however, and especially after Japan’s victory in the war with China (1894-1895), some writers pushed back against Eurocentric assumptions, demanding world histories that made more room for Japan, and Asia generally.

After the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) and the colonization of Korea (1910), Japan emerged as an imperial power, and public discussion of school world history nearly vanished. As the Korean world historian Jie-Hyun Lim has observed, “World history was thus diagnosed with infection by the Western disease. Japanese intellectuals . . . lamented the distortion of the Japanese spirit by Western modernity and sought opportunities to remedy the perceived ills of Westernization.” Asian history thus came to the fore, though one that privileged Japan as the key to modernization for other Asian peoples. The country’s political turn to rightist authoritarianism in the interwar period meant that by the late 1930s school children’s study of history amounted to courses centered on ultranationalist and militaristic indoctrination. Since Korea was Japan’s colonial possession, its schools had publicly to follow along.

When World War II ended, the American occupiers of both Japan and South Korea quickly dismantled the authoritarian education systems in both countries, introducing in its place ideologies and structures directly imported from the United States. The progressive principle that education should be egalitarian, functional, inquiry-based, and dedicated to the formation of a

---

rational, publicly-informed citizenry was one educational influence. Policy experts contributed the ideas that responsible participation in civic life required young people to engage with an eclectic curriculum of social studies, including geography, economics, civics, and U.S. history, as well as world history that would be weighted toward the modern and contemporary. In this way, so the American military authorities declared, both Japan and South Korea would put down roots of constitutional democracy.69

Postwar schools in both Korea and Japan mirrored the common American practice of requiring world history at the secondary level, though it privileged the European past, as American schools did for another three decades. New universities that the United States helped build in both countries introduced the American model of general education, which exposed many college students, in contrast to most European youth, to Western Civ, and eventually to world history. The American authorities intended this curriculum to help eradicate the stains of Japanese authoritarianism and Korean colonial subjugation by teaching Western civic values. Furthermore, liberal democracy offered a countervailing ideology to communist doctrine in postwar North Korea and, after 1949, Maoism in China.

By the late 1980s, however, some educators in Korea and Japan became convinced of the need to climb off the intellectual pendulum that had been swinging between Western and Asian centrisms since the late nineteenth century. As in China and in Europe a bit earlier, the end of Cold War polarity, rapidly globalizing economies, and immediate electronic access to knowledge worldwide suggested a world history that spotlighted neither Europe nor Asia but that explored the humanocentric model that some American world historians had begun to articulate not much earlier. The thickening webs of international exchange among professionals, in person or via the Internet, meant that more of the mainly anglophone world historical literature found its way, translated or not, into Japanese, Korean, and Chinese universities — and eventually to precollegiate teachers. Many East Asian historians may have known the work of William McNeill for some time, but after 1990 the writings of Marshall Hodgson, Alfred Crosby, Andre Gunder Frank, Jerry Bentley, Patrick Manning, Kenneth Pomeranz, and other world historians became subjects of discussion in conference halls and seminar rooms.

In the new century, the institutionalizing of world history studies got seriously underway. In 2004, Jie-Hyun Lim founded the Research Institute of

---

Comparative History and Culture at Hanyang University in Seoul. In 2010 the institute organized the first Flying University of Transnational Humanities, a one-week international summer program for graduate students and young scholars interested in transnational history and contemporary issues. In 2015, Lim initiated the Critical Global Studies Institute at Sogang University. The credo of the institute’s graduate program privileges interactional phenomena scale: “Critical knowledge and practice beyond existing boundaries are required to aptly and creatively respond to the challenges and tasks of the global era such as capital and technology crossing national borders, migration and migrant workers, international territorial disputes and genocide, the environment, and the rights of social minorities.”

Owing to modified adoption of the American social studies curriculum model after the war, many high schools introduced world history. Since then, the ministry of education has required this course off and on; currently it is taught as an elective. Nevertheless, Korean historians have been producing new textbooks that give significant attention to the interrelations of peoples and societies across time.

Japan has paralleled Korea in the growth of institutions dedicated to innovative world-scale research and teaching. The Research Institute of World History founded in Tokyo in 2004 is an independent center dedicated to advancing the field at all instructional levels. This center endeavors to disseminate information of value to researchers and educators, publish books and book reviews, evaluate textbooks, sponsor scholarly projects, promote academic exchanges, and introduce world history as an important intellectual discipline to the Japanese public.

At Osaka University the Global History Division of the Institute for Open and Transdisciplinary Research Initiative dates to 2003, when Shigeru Akita and colleagues introduced a series of seminars on global history. The Global History Division sponsors a variety of programs similar to those of the Tokyo institute, including a summer school program for high school teachers. World history is a compulsory subject in Japan’s state secondary schools, and students may elect to take three years of the subject. In 2022 the ministry of education intends to introduce a mandatory course that integrates world

---

70. Sogang University, Critical Global Studies Institute, Graduate Program in Critical Global Studies, http://cgsi.ac/eng/sub/sub03_04.php?ptype=eng_sub03_04.
history with Japanese history. This plan has no parallel that I know of in American public school, although the AHA has been encouraging projects to blend more world history into U.S. courses, and vice versa.

**World History Education in Other Countries**

In other regions of the Eastern Hemisphere, investment in world history research or education has grown more slowly, despite the enthusiasm of a few world-minded scholars in universities in several countries. One interesting program is the Bachelor of Human Sciences in “History and Civilization” at the International Islamic University Malaysia. The curriculum is dedicated to Islamic perspectives but takes an integrated approach to the human past, endorsing “a creative synthesis of the Islamic legacy and Western knowledge.” Further west, Qatar University, influenced by the American general education philosophy, requires world history of all majors and minors in the discipline. In Morocco, interest in world history education is limited but not absent. Almost nowhere is world history a required or elective course at any level of public education. The notable exception is Al-Akhawayn University, an English-language institution committed to “the American liberal arts model.” A course in modern world history is an option in the GE curriculum and mandatory for certain majors. An advanced course in international history from 1914 to the present is also offered. In Sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa’s Stellenbosch University, offers a master’s degree in global studies as part of the multinational consortium of universities administered from Leipzig University, discussed earlier. The African Network in World History has undertaken few projects since its founding in 2009. Plans are afoot, however, for an international meeting of the association in Dakar in the next year or two.

---

World history courses in precollegiate schools in Africa and Asia obviously vary hugely from one country, province, or school district to another, and I have gathered only a sampling of data on precollegiate curriculum. One country that stands out, however, is India. In contrast to the three East Asian states I have discussed, India has only one research institute with world historical interests, at least that I have identified. This is the Ibn Batuta International Center for Cultural and Civilizational Studies, a division of the Islamic Ma’din International Academy located in Calicut (Kozhikode), Kerala.81 In addition, the University of Hyderabad and Asoka University have both initiated single world history courses.82 By contrast, world history education in precollegiate state schools is impressively strong. The country’s enormous public education system struggles with scarce funding, high dropout rates, teacher shortages, neglect in rural areas, Hindu nationalist bias in curriculum and textbooks, and other challenging problems. Nevertheless, India’s Central Board of Secondary Education requires substantial student exposure to world history, at least on paper. In grade eleven, for example, the syllabus is a chronologically organized investigation of the human past from the paleolithic era to modern times, a course close to the typical American high school requirement, though topics of study are more selective.

Comparing world history education in Egypt, India, and Britain between 1950 and 1970, Susan Douglass has argued persuasively that in both India and Egypt textbooks and official protocols welcomed students to survey a wider view of the world and its past than did Britain, where racialized and culturally arrogant characterizations of other societies, especially populations in the rapidly disappearing colonial empire, endured for a quarter century after World War II.83 Since 1991, when the British government announced the new national curriculum, topics in non-British history have moved in and out with periodic revisions. Today, however, students in Indian state schools ideally study far more world history than they do in England, where the most recent round of official revisions expunged more world history than it introduced.

Conclusion

World history education in institutions of learning is a particular type of modern cultural production that evolved first in the peculiar social, cultural, and political climate of the United States starting in the later nineteenth century. From then to the present, as I have written, the definition and central

82. Rila Mukherjee, Personal communication, Oct. 5, 2018.
The objectives of world history study have significantly changed at least four times. Most recently, beginning in the 1990s, the reality of a fluid, ever-mutating, network-driven world urged not only a more dynamic conceptualization of the modern centuries but also abandonment of the whole notion that civilizations and other boxed “cultures” had ever existed as standing entities. More educators became sensitive to the idea of the civilization, also named “complex society,” as a malleable, unstable, socially constructed concept. Historians took on more research projects that were not so dependent on orthodox configurations of space and time. They also aimed to situate their subject in global contexts wherever relevant. These practices required much fresh thought about geographical units and divisions, shifting scales, periodization, key turning points, the development and meaning of networks, and novel historical questions that no one had so far asked.

The world history movements that gathered steam in Europe and Asia in the 1990s had in some measure to challenge older Eurocentric views of the usable past or a bipolar perspective that privileged Europe and East Asia. These movements, however, largely escaped the multiculturalist tribulations that rocked American education off and on for four decades and that contributed to civilization-by-civilization world history. Professionals in China, Korea, and Japan who learned about American efforts to more systemically globalize the human past, or who discovered for themselves the value of such an endeavor, proceeded to innovate along similar lines. And they appear to have done it without fierce resistance from either national history experts or nationalist ideologues, whether in government or not. In both East Asia and Europe, the earthshaking political events of the 80s and 90s helped activate interest in global history. European universities typically taught that region’s past as separate courses on ancient, medieval, or modern topics and did not conceive of these subjects as representing the whole human story. America’s Western Civ tradition, a border-crossing course that often pose as a form of world history but that also helped pave the way for the real thing, attracted little academic interest among European educators. There, global history emerged from the start as a holistically world-scale, or at least a transnational and interregional intellectual experiment.

But despite much imaginative research and teaching, the promise of a humanocentric world history is far from fulfilled. The nationalist or civilizationist ideology remains tenacious in the world’s schools and universities. The humanocentric “new world history” that excites a growing

84. For a penetrating critique of “civilization” as a flawed historical construction, see Bruce Mazlish, Civilization and Its Discontents (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2005).
body of professionals remains sadly unfamiliar to many educational decision-makers, including textbook companies, legislatures, public agencies, and funding bodies, as well as American social studies practitioners who believe that schools teach too much history in and not enough social science and civics. Persistent misunderstanding or ignorance has produced aggravating signs. In American universities study of the humanities in general has been in decline for several years. Memberships in professional associations dedicated to the humanities and the social sciences has dropped. Meanwhile, politicians and educational managers constantly urge the young to choose STEM careers (science, technology, engineering, and math). Presumably, universities will thus produce enthusiastic and talented, though not particularly literate, corporate employees who aim for salaries that will far surpass those of history teachers. The right-wing nationalist upswing in a disturbingly large number of countries is also a concern among educators. Ultranationalist regimes might well seek to reconstruct educational programs, insisting that homeland curriculum be written to bolster state ideology and interests and that study of the rest of the world should be left to government officials, diplomats, and corporate planners.85 In many countries, in fact, university history faculties themselves take relatively minor interest in research or teaching on foreign areas, never mind world history. For example, as of 2013, U.S. academics specializing in East Asian history accounted for less than 9 percent of a surveyed total; in the United Kingdom it was less than 2 percent. A bit over 4 percent of U.S. historians specialized in African history; in the UK less than 3 percent did. The historians who produced these figures have also written: “In the United Kingdom, 84 percent of all historians work on the UK, Europe, or North America. Coincidentally, that’s also the percentage of the world’s population that lives outside those regions: 16 percent of UK historians are left to work on 84 percent of the planet’s collective heritage.”86

This comparative review of developments in the United States and several other countries makes clear that a fuller understanding of growth and change in world history education worldwide will require much more research, time, and support. Numerous essential questions remain to be addressed. I have identified a variety of programs in universities and other institutions in a

selection of countries, but with the partial exception of the United States I have not examined precisely what sort of world history professionals in these places teach, how they teach it, and, no doubt most important, what students learn. We should also ask other questions: Is there a general consensus among educators and students as to the definition of world history as a subject of learning? In what social, economic, and cultural circumstances do young people in schools and degree-granting institutions study a subject like world history? What sort of training for world history instruction do school teachers and academic lecturers have or need? In what ways do governments and public agencies encourage or inhibit world history education? Are there distinct conceptual differences between world, global, transnational, world-system, and universal history as fields of study?

With whatever success we investigate the history and current state of world history education in numerous if not all national states, I am convinced that in the coming decades history scholars and teachers must help direct the world’s full attention to the fate of our species, and this will require that all states grasp the imperative of knowing the past, present, and future on a planetary scale. The East Asian educators I have read or talked to in recent years seem especially eager to build world history into all levels of learning. Jie-Hyun Lim’s investigations in Japan and Korea persuade him that “world history is on the verge of blossoming,” at least in those two countries. Writing from Fudan University in Shanghai in 2017, Yunshen Gu affirmed: “I believe that by continuing to promote global history in China, we will encourage more young scholars to devote themselves to the study of history, train them to be openminded, and help them appreciate the pluralistic nature of the world. As the concept of global history evolves, it will also serve as a source of inspiration for historians in China and around the world.”

---

88. Lim, “Historicizing the World,” 430.
Bibliography


Brookins, Julia. “Survey Finds Fewer College Students Enrolling in College History Courses.” Perspectives on History 54, no. 6 (2016): 10-1.


University of Leipzig, Global and European Studies Institute, The Master’s Course in Global Studies, http://gesi.sozphil.uni-leipzig.de/masters/globalstudies/.


Titre: Evolution mondiale de l'enseignement de l'histoire globale


Mots-clés: Grande histoire, histoire globale, études de l’histoire, études sociales, histoire transnationale, histoire universelle, civilisation de l’ouest, histoire mondiale, histoire mondiale programmes d’enseignement, histoire mondiale institutions, histoire mondiale recherche, histoire mondiale manuels.
Título: Evolución global de la enseñanza de la historia global

Resumen: Los eruditos han estado escribiendo historias mundiales desde la antigüedad. Pero como un curso sistemático de estudio en instituciones educativas, la historia mundial se remonta solo a finales del siglo XIX. Desde entonces, la historia mundial, también denominada “historia global,” ha evolucionado como un tipo de producción cultural, aunque varía significativamente según el país. Este artículo examina la historia de la historia mundial como un movimiento educativo moderno. Sostengo que los maestros y académicos en los Estados Unidos “inventaron” la educación de historia mundial a fines del siglo XIX. Los modelos estadounidenses, aunque redefinidos varias veces, más tarde influyeron en la germinación de este tema en otras partes del mundo. Desde aproximadamente 1990, la fundación de institutos, centros, y programas de historia mundial como empresas tanto intelectuales como pedagógicas ha avanzado significativamente en Europa y Asia Oriental. Desafortunadamente, el crecimiento de la educación de historia mundial en los EE. UU. Se ha ralentizado por varias razones. Además, los estudios de historia mundial aún no se han arraigado en la mayoría de los países del mundo. Los avances adicionales en este esfuerzo requerirán mucho tiempo, investigación, y apoyo. Las preguntas esenciales deben ser abordadas. ¿Puede haber un consenso general entre los educadores con respecto a la definición de la historia mundial como tema de aprendizaje? ¿Qué tipo de capacitación necesitan los educadores? ¿De qué manera las agencias públicas alientan o inhiben la educación de historia mundial?

Palabras clave: gran historia, historia global, educación de historia, ciencias sociales, historia transnacional, historia universal, civilización del oeste, historia mundial, plan de estudios de historia mundial, instituciones de historia mundial, investigación de historia mundial, libros de texto de historia mundial.